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61. Introduction
The 19th century was  vibrant  era  where  many of  the  old  traditional  components  of  society, 
economy and technology changed at  an  incredible  pace.  This  transformation  started out  in  the 
north-west  of  Europe  and  the  north-east  of  the  United  States  but  soon  had  repercussions  for 
societies all over the globe. This expanding wave reached China and Southeast Asia (or Nanyang as 
the Chinese call the region1) mid 19th century and had profound effects on the region.
Technological advances made by the European powers made it possible to further advance into 
the east Asian region. Steam powered ships made it possible to sail outside the monsoon season and 
steadily became faster and faster. Advances in weaponry gave Europeans the edge when military 
conflicts  occurred.  The  Spanish  and  Dutch  had  held  trade  settlements  in  the  region  for  some 
centuries yet now started to actively expand the territories they controlled. The British obtained the 
Straits Settlements and later also Hong Kong. After years of encroachment the French finally landed 
in Indo-China and directly controlled the former kingdoms of Annam and Tonkin.2
The trade networks  in  Southeast  Asia  of  the  merchant  families  in  south Fujian  was heavily 
disrupted by these incursions. European colonial ports had a tendency to prefer ships sailing under 
their own flag. Even after these mercantilistic policies died out during the 19 th century, a preference 
was given to European merchants over their Asian counterparts. A phenomenon a Chinese merchant 
could only lament as he, opposed to his European colleague, could not count on the support of his 
enterprise by his government. Where in the past European and Chinese merchants supplemented 
each other in the international trade, Chinese junks were now increasingly pushed out of the market 
by Europeans.
One of the factors that contributed to the decline of the former position of the Chinese merchant 
was the rise of the opium trade. Before the rise of opium, Europeans came to the Chinese in search 
of silk, tea and other exotics. They were the asking party whilst Chinese merchants could set the 
prices, most of which were paid in bullion. This position was reversed as an increasing demand for 
opium was felt in the Chinese economy. The repercussions were felt in terms of a shifting trade 
balance, but far more reaching were the two wars fought that bear the name of the substance.
A fleet of British ships went to war when the Qing bureaucracy started to take measures against 
1 Literally speaking the Chinese call the waters where the islands of Southeast Asia lie the Nanyang, a term which 
translates roughly to southern ocean. It is commonly used to refer to the region and in this thesis it will used as an 
equivalent of Southeast Asia. 
Murray, Dian. 'Piracy and China's Maritime Transition, 1750-1850', in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong (eds.). 
Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850, (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.55
2 Lockard, Craig A. Southeast Asia in World History, (New York NY, 2009), p.102-104
7the expanding opium abuse and loss of bullion caused by the abuse. This restrictive action was 
taken as an excuse to open hostilities and open up the Chinese Empire for western trade. Instead of 
the single port of Canton (current Guangzhou) where western merchants were allowed before 1842, 
the Treaty of Nanking issued the opening of four more ports  to western entrepreneurs  and the 
cession of the island of Hong Kong. The second war was fought by a coalition of nations versus 
China and ended with the Treaty of Tianjin that formally legalised the opium trade and opened even 
more of the hinterland for European commercial incursion in 1860.3
The economic woes of China and the string of rebellions that occurred in China in the two 
decades after 1850, severely disrupted the stability of the Chinese Empire. At the same time the 
abolition of slave trade made the demand for cheap labour worldwide skyrocket. Emigration, while 
formally forbidden for a period over three years in length, took flight, as the lands of the Qing 
dynasty were forcefully integrated into a globalization economy.4
The Chinese that  already settled in  the Nanyang had to  cope with these new arrivals.  They 
brought with them a different view on the world and different notion of what it meant to be Chinese. 
At  the  same  time  European  nationalism  and  the  derogatory  views  of  exotic  cultures  that 
accompanied  it,  reshuffled  relations  in  the  European  colonies  in  Southeast  Asia.  It  became 
necessary to develop an identity that was inherently linked to ethnicity and clearly positioned the 
community into colonial society.5 
In these turbulent times I want to look at two major processes that were occurring in the region. 
One; the decline of the strong position of the traditional Chinese trading network and two; the start 
of major migrant streams originating from the Chinese mainland. Both of these processes made use 
of a similar infrastructure that was laid out over the seas. But was there a connection between the 
these two phenomena other than time? 
To examine this possibility I propose the use of an hypothesis. The hypothesis: The Chinese 
trading network in Southeast Asia, under competition of European trade, switched to alternative 
commercial endeavours, primarily the transport of migrants. To narrow down the research I want to 
check the validity of this hypothesis by examining one point in the network namely the port city of 
Batavia (current Jakarta).
In  Batavia,  the  seat  of  the  colonial  government  of  the  Netherlands  Indies,  these  major 
3 Wong, John Yue-wo. Deadly dreams: opium, imperialism and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China, 
(Cambridge, 1998) 
4 Pan, Lynn (ed.). The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas, (Richmond, 1999), p.54-55
5 Suryadinata, Leo. Understanding the Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, (Singapore, 2007), p.118-119, Wang, 
Gungwu. The Chinese Overseas – From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy, (Cambridge MA, 2000), 
p.64, Taylor, Jean Gelman. The Social World of Batavia – European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia, (Madison, 1983), 
p.115-116, McKeown, Adam. 'Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949', in: The Journal of Asian Studies  
Vol.58 no.2 (Ann Arbor, 1999), p.326
8transformations,  the  decline  of  the  Chinese  trading  position  and  migration  of  Chinese  people 
overseas, came together. The port city was a trade centre that lost its former importance and wealth. 
An expanding Dutch presence through Java and local society left less room for cosmopolitan ideas, 
yet Batavia had long history of Chinese settlement in and around the city. Furthermore as the Dutch 
implemented the cultivation system, the former local economy was thoroughly changed.
While  examining one  node within  a  network by no means  paints  a  complete  picture of  the 
transformation occurring in entire web, looking at only one segment provides a starting piece of 
mapping  such  network  transformations.  Batavia  provides  us  with  a  great  opportunity  as  all 
international connections of the Dutch colony were concentrated in its harbour as part of measures 
coinciding with the cultivation system. Furthermore, examining this segment will hopefully give a 
new perspective to look at  the Chinese role in regional history between 1820 and 1870 and an 
incentive to broaden the scope of conventional national oriented histories.
To fully examine the potential correlation between the decline of conventional Chinese trade and 
the rise of Chinese overseas migration, I make a distinction between macro and local developments 
in following chapters. Large regional developments had the potential to influence the situation in 
Batavia.  By  dealing  with  these  separately  from  the  local  conditions,  a  structured  and  clear 
understanding of the entire situation hopefully can be obtained.
To begin this thesis I will start with a chapter examining the concepts used in historiography to 
describe, analyse and depict the Chinese overseas. The debates surrounding these analytical tools 
are  useful  to  mention  because,  besides  giving  a  better  understanding  of  the  past  intellectual 
contributions, they also give insight in the current perspectives on Chinese minorities in Southeast 
Asia. Furthermore this methodology is essential in creating the necessary framework to pose my 
hypothesis  in.  As  networks  and  infrastructure  are  an  integral  part  of  this  hypothesis  a  clear 
understanding of the theoretic model used to examine the problem is necessary.
The chapter that follows deals with the economic developments in east Asia and examines the 
decline  of  traditional  trade  possibilities  for  Chinese  junk  captains.6 A number  of  commercial 
endeavours  will  be  summarily  reviewed  that  potentially  could  have  provided  alternatives  to 
traditional marine trade. This provides us a broad sketch of economic climate for Chinese junk 
merchants in mid 19th century where naturally an emphasis is given to the situation in the Dutch 
entrepôt of Batavia. 
The next part of the thesis will examine the surge of migrant flows out of the Chinese Empire 
and in particular the stream that went to Southeast Asia. The potential reasons for emigration will be 
6 The junk was the regular sailing vessel used in Qing China. See the photograph on the cover for an early 20th century 
example of two junks.
9briefly covered, as will the organisations making these migrant flows possible. The legal situation 
as codified by the Dutch, for Chinese migrants reaching Java and Batavia will get specific attention. 
Furthermore any conclusions are connected with those of the previous chapter on the economic 
situation on Java and Madura.7
The final chapter I will combine the outcomes of these two perspectives on Batavia into one 
overarching analysis. Will this hypothesis hold, after been scrutinized by findings in the available 
sources, or will the sources hold no clues that point toward such claims? Hopefully the examination 
alone will provide larger insight in the workings of a marine economy that does rarely get the full 
attention it deserves. Lets see if passengers transport was a viable market, or pasar as bazaars are 
known in the Indonesian and Malay language. 
2. Concepts and Terms
When examining the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia a multitude of concepts are used by 
historians to clarify their analyses and conclusions. The use of the concepts involved, nevertheless 
still  ensues  debate  as  the  meaning they hold  is  not  uniformly accepted  amongst  scholars.  The 
political implications of writings by historians causes the debate not only to be held on a descriptive 
historic level but also on a present day political level. The place a minority as the ethnic Chinese 
would  and  could  take  in  host  societies  is  directly  or  indirectly  influenced  by  these  writings. 
Especially  in  the  new  nation  states  in  Southeast  Asia  emerging  from  the  remains  of  former 
European colonies,  the  Chinese  living within their  borders  were  met  with a  certain  amount  of 
suspicion.8 
These sensitivities surrounding the concepts used as terminology are not only confined to the 
intellectual and political level, but change shape in regards to the rudimentary size of the territory 
involved in the analysis.  A global perspective on overseas Chinese will  have less to qualms to 
describe and depict migrant streams in terms of settlers, whilst in Southeast Asia this term has a  
more heavy meaning. It implies some form of colonisation, possibly taking land and opportunities 
that  would  otherwise  be  solely preserved for  local  population.  Such conclusions  could  lead  to 
negative sentiments towards the current Chinese minority living in Southeast Asia. This writing 
7 The choice for Java and Madura is one dictated by the sources, as these territories in the Netherlands Indies are the 
only ones in constant Dutch control in the examined period and thus have a stable amount of statistical data 
available.
8 Wang, Gungwu. China and Chinese Overseas, (Singapore, 1991), p.176-178, Wang, Gungwu. 'Sojourning: the 
Chinese experience in Southeast Asia', in: Anthony Reid & Kristine Aliluna-Rodgers (eds.). Sojourners and Settlers  
– Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, (St. Leonards, 1996), p.2, 11, McKeown, Adam. 'From Opium 
Farmer to Astronaut: A Global History of Diasporic Chinese Business', in: Diaspora – A Journal of Transnational  
Studies Vol.9 no.3 (New York, 2000), p.347
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environment should be taken into consideration when researching the overseas Chinese.9
A first step to define these concepts can be done by describing what and whom are designated by 
the adjective “Chinese”. A seemingly simple definition: someone or something from China. Yet 
such a straightforward definition does not encompass all the diversity within this group of people, 
nor does it the emphasize the variety of views Chinese were perceived by others. Whether those 
views were created by personal experiences inside China, in one of the towns in the Nanyang or just 
based on hearsay from others,  all  these  details  are  lost  to  the  beholder  by just  using the  term 
Chinese. 
To put in abstract form: in this essay I will be focussing on the connection between China and 
Java. In these two nodes of an overseas connection, a diverse variety of meanings of the identity 
“Chinese” existed. The sheer difference between those two nodes; an Imperial Realm and a colony 
of an awakening nation state, only increased friction what it meant for travellers to be Chinese. In 
the following paragraphs I shortly emphasize the multitude of identities Chinese wore themselves or 
were cloaked in when travelling to the Nanyang. Views that originated in the node of departure in 
China, or in the other node of the connection, the society where the travellers arrived in.
Within the group labelled as Chinese, there exists a large amount of different ethnicities living in 
their  separate  home regions  within the territories of imperial  China.  For this  essay I  will  limit 
myself to the groups that were active in the Southeast Asia in the 19th century. This means I will 
refrain myself mainly to those Chinese ethnicities that lived on or near the southern shores of China 
in the current provinces of Fujian and Guangdong.10
starting with the Hokkien Chinese, originating from the area around Amoy (current Xiamen). 
They were traditionally involved in the trade to Southeast Asia and particularly prominent in the 
European  colonial  cities  of  both  Batavia  and  Manila.  Secondly  there  were  the  Cantonese, 
originating  from  the  bay  of  Canton  who  were  primarily  involved  in  organising  the  trade  of 
Europeans in the  bay area and port of Canton, which was prior to the Treaty of Nanking. the only 
port  European traders could dock at  when entering Chinese waters.  Another  noteworthy ethnic 
group from China active in the Nanyang were the Hakka, mostly working in loosely organised 
enterprises at frontier regions of the archipelago in tin mines or woodcutter colonies. The Hakka 
Chinese were also in great numbers amongst the indentured labourers, or coolies as they are known 
in the west, than the former mentioned ethnicities. When Chinese are mentioned further along in 
this  essay  they  will  be  predominantly  of  Hokkien  origin  unless  clearly  stated  otherwise.  The 
Chinese with a connection to the island of Java were mostly of Hokkien origin.11
9 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p. 307
10  See figure 1 (page 5) for a map with names of places in the region, referred to in this thesis.
11  Hoetink, B. 'Chineesche officieren te Batavia onder de Compagnie', in: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en  
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Of course the summary above is just a rough sketch illustrating the diversity on Chinese side. It 
by no means provides an absolute order of Chinese ethnicities and their professions abroad, some 
mixing between groups undoubtedly must have taken place. However, the organisational structure 
Chinese merchants used tended to be in close relation to familial structure, resulting in relatively 
homogeneously ethnic groups operating in particular branches of business.12 
A more difficult task consists of mapping the actual ethnicities of settlers in Southeast Asia. 
Acculturation  with  the  local  population  took  place  over  many of  years  clouding  the  image  to 
reconstruct. Some painstaking work towards unravelling this question has been done by Salmon & 
Lombard  by  mapping  deities  worshipped  abroad  and  connecting  those  with  the  same  deities 
worshipped  in  certain  regions  of  China.  Still  the  situation  remains  muddled  since  Chinese 
assimilation took place at different rates according to variables such as; the size of the settlement, 
level of sophistication of the local culture, numbers of settlers and the frequency of contact with 
overseas  traders.  According  to  William Skinner  Chinese  settler  groups  would,  if  they  were  of 
sufficient size, have a higher chance retaining their heritage if there was no profit in social status to 
be made by changing their cultural behaviour.13
This were some distinctions that Chinese people also made amongst themselves. But how were 
Chinese perceived in the harbours and settlements of Southeast Asia? To compare these Chinese 
communities overseas a useful methodology has been been explored. There existed differences in 
relations  with  the  local  native  population,  ruling  class  and  specific  commercial  enterprises 
throughout these scattered settlements in Southeast Asia. Yet despite these major differences one 
main distinction between Chinese was made in all larger settlements in the Nanyang. There were 
Chinese that lived there for some generations and there were those that were just arriving from 
China. A rough division indeed but essential in terms of social behaviour. Many fine publications 
exist covering this topic and therefore I will only elaborate on the situation in region under research, 
the island of Java.14
Java, which was the central island of the Netherlands Indies, had a long history with Chinese 
immigrants.  Even before  the  Dutch  arrived  and settled in  Batavia,  Chinese were active  in  and 
around  Java.  Under  Dutch  governance  their  numbers  quickly  rose.  Whilst  Dutch  bureaucracy 
Volkenkunde van Nederlandsche-Indië Vol.78, ('s-Gravenhage, 1922), p.1, Skinner, G. William. ‘Creolized Chinese 
Societies in Southeast Asia’, in: Anthony Reid & Kristine Aliluna-Rodgers (eds.). Sojourners and Settlers –  
Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, (St. Leonards, 1996), p.50, McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.329
12 Gardella, Robert. 'Enterprises, Contracts and Partnerships: A Case for Chinese Customary Tradition Bridging the 
Nanyang',  in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong (eds.). Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850, (Wiesbaden, 
2004), p.290, Kuhn, Philip A. Chinese Amongst Others: emigration in modern times, (Lanham MD, 2008), p.184
13 Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese', p.66, Salmon, C. & Lombard, D. Les Chinois de Jakarta - Temples et vie collective,  
(Paris, 1980)
14 Examples of fine comparing studies are: Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese', Suryadinata, Ethnic Chinese.
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officially only recognized them as part of the category Foreign Asiatics (vreemde oosterlingen), in 
practice the Chinese stood out as distinct group because of their economic success. Amongst the 
native population a distinction was made in the 19th century between peranakan and totok Chinese. 
Two designations of Chinese that are best summarized as a combination of ethnic, cultural and 
religious components.15
Peranakan Chinese  is  a  term  used  to  describe  ethnic  Chinese  that  had  lived  for  several 
generations on Java and therefore became part of local society. Initial Chinese settlers had taken 
local wives but subsequent generations intermarried whenever possible. They remained a distinct 
group  within  society  with  their  own  customs  and  cultural  heritage  yet  their  priorities  were 
decisively local. Forming a middle class between the Dutch colonizer and the local Javanese, their 
position was contested but essential. Traditionally a respectable individual, prominent within the 
entire minority, was granted some legal authority over them by the Dutch Indies government. To 
this institution I will return in greater detail later on in this thesis.16
Totok Chinese became prominent during the beginning of the 20th  century but started to become 
noticeable  during  the  latter  part  of  19th century.  Born  in  mainland  China,  they  were  prone  to 
preserve their Chineseness and often set up groups and schools to re-sinicize overseas Chinese. 
Being born in the nationalist era they became acutely aware of their identity and were suspicious of 
anyone 'loitering'  their precious heritage. Ideologically speaking they were more inclined to the 
Chinese  Empire  and  a  form of  pan-Chineseness  than  to  the  local  societies  in  the  Indonesian 
archipelago.  These  totok Chinese had no bond with the prominent  local  Chinese figures  as the 
peranakan Chinese  did,  and  therefore  were  less  susceptible  by  colonial  state  institutions  that 
operated through these respectable elders.17
Temporary migrants from China, whether indentured labourer or free labourer, also belonged to 
this category. Sojourning back to their home village after the job abroad was finished these migrant 
purely came seeking personal profit. The society or environment they stayed in was of secondary 
concern.  On Java these migrants  had gotten the name  sinkeh18 and were regarded even by the 
Chinese community as people from the lowest class. Often the people were completely dependent 
on  their  employer  as  they  themselves  did  not  speak  local  language(s)  or  had  much,  if  any, 
knowledge about local society.19
15 Chen, Menghong. De Chinese gemeenschap van Batavia, 1843-1865; een onderzoek naar het Kong Koan-Archief,  
(Leiden, 2009), p.144, Lohanda, Mona. The Kapitan Cina of Batavia 1837-1942, (Jakarta, 1996), p.2-10, Skinner, 
'Creolized Chinese', p.53, Wang, Chinese Overseas, p.56, 
16 Lohanda, Kapitan Cina, p.188, Wang, Chinese Overseas, p.56-57
17 Kuhn, Chinese Amongst Others, p.153, Lohanda, Kapitan Cina, p.9-10, McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.324
18 Multiple spellings of the term exist, “sinkeh” has been gaining ground as a standard in English literature.
19 Chen, Chinese Gemeenschap, p.137, Dobbin, Christine. Asian Entrepreneural Minorities – Conjoints Communities  
in the Making of the World-Economy 1570-1940, (Richmond, 1996), p.187, Somers Heidhues, Mary F. Bangka Tin 
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The meaning of these terms cannot entirely be conveyed by stagnant variables as the subject 
they try to describe was also a changing group of people. Characteristics of the group changed over 
time, differed per region examined and even the terms used to label groups in society changed over 
the years. Especially the term peranakan has transformed over time. Prior to the 19th century this 
term was specifically used for Chinese settlers that had converted to the Islamic faith. Until 1828 
they were granted the same autonomous rights as their non Islamic Chinese counterparts but were 
separately organised entirely.  As Islamic doctrine went against  many of the traditional  customs 
originating from Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism what were practised by other Chinese,  a 
definite divergence between the groups ensued. Ultimately the Islamic converts were assimilated by 
the  local  population  while  the  'regular'  Chinese  became  known  as  peranakan.  The  arrival  of 
newcomers from China that became known as totok Chinese, as mentioned above, only increased 
the pace of this process.  Peranakan increasingly became known as a term to describe Java born 
Chinese while totok designated those who were born in China. This transformation of the concept 
peranakan took place during the latter half of the 19th century as differences between local Chinese 
and new arrivals became apparent. By the second quarter of the 20th century the old designation as 
Islamic convert was almost forgotten.20
Besides the transformation of certain labels over time as those listed above, there also continues 
to exist miscommunication about naming groups. Especially the term “coolie” remains bearing a 
perspective of semi-slavery in the west. Yet this view of a Chinese coolie as a semi-slave has its 
inconsistencies. The abdominal conditions of some Chinese migrants has been taken as a showcase 
for all Chinese migration to stress the point of free labour migration across the Atlantic Ocean to 
non free  migration in  the east.  Literature  will  not  go as  far  as  labelling  the complete  Chinese 
migration as coolie  migration yet  dearly overstresses the importance of  its  share.  Secondly the 
significance of debt of these labourers is poorly understood and excesses concerning these debts are 
taken as a standard for all. In recent years some revisions has been made to this image by scholars 
to better understand coolie labour and clarify the part debt truly played in the labour migration from 
China.21 
A categorisation of labourers that was in practice then and survived the ravages of time is the 
distinction between laukehs and sinkehs. Sinkeh was known on Java to be used in a rather negative 
sense, as mentioned earlier. Purely semantically speaking though, the term just meant “newcomer”. 
and Mentok Pepper – Chinese Settlement on an Indonesian Island, (Singapore, 1992), p.42-43, 58
20 Lohanda, Kapitan Cina, p.6, Suryadinata, Ethnic Chinese, p.112-113
21 Kuhn, Chinese Amongst Others, p.114-115, McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.317, Somers Heidhues, Banka Tin, p. 
59-60, Wang, China, p.6-7
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In relation to  laukeh the term was used to describe an inexperienced indentured labourer while a 
laukeh had previous experience working in Southeast Asia. It depended on the individual how fast 
he would lose the designation of sinkeh amongst his peers at work. Furthermore were laukehs more 
often employed in the organisational structure of the enterprise. They took on jobs as recruiters and 
travelled back to rural China to find and convince new labourers to come to the Nanyang. Other 
laukehs stayed in Southeast Asia after paying of their debt and made up a flexible experienced 
workforce in the archipelago. And finally there were those that would independently start a new 
enterprise,  on  Borneo  for  example.  These  options  were  often  interchangeable  as  not  everyone 
succeeded in their plans, some even had to go back in debt. Nevertheless as he did not need to learn 
the ropes once more, he would not be considered a sinkeh upon return.22
It is less clear who the term coolie includes and who it excludes as it initially seems. While 
labour migrants from China during the second half of the 19th and early decade of the 20th century 
could be called coolies, migrant streams originating in China after the Second World War could 
hardly apply for this label. Nevertheless consisted both migrant streams of labourers that usually 
had agreed to some sort of debt construction to afford the journey out of China. In effect they paid 
for the fare in labour by arrival in the host country. Many Europeans crossing the Atlantic during the 
mass migration of the late 19th and begin 20th century used the same method.23
Similarly the Chinese labourers that tried their luck in the gold rushes of the late 19th century 
made use of the same infrastructure and institutional context to travel to their destination as coolies.  
The journey to the gold fields was being financed by a third party in a credit-for-ticket construction 
that  was  remarkably  akin  to  the  contracts  coolie  labourers  going  to  the  plantations  signed. 
Furthermore  the  debt  made by travel  was not  tied  to  one employer,  they could  and would  be 
exchanged  as  any  other  form  of  debt.  Because  of  the  potential  transferability  of  their  debt 
technically both groups were not comprised entirely of labourers imprisoned in debt. Nonetheless 
are  the latter  seen as coolies because of their  work while  the former are  seen as plain fortune 
seekers.24
Thus  simply  the  view  that  most  migrants  from  China  would  be  coolies  slaving  away  on 
plantations and mines is incorrect. This does not mean there existed no excesses within the Chinese 
labourers overseas and that the working conditions were hard. Only that this  view was not the 
22 Breman, Jan. Koelies, Planters en Koloniale Politiek – Het arbeidsregime op de grootlandbouwondernemingen aan  
Sumatra's Oostkust in het begin van de twintigste eeuw, (Leiden, 1992), p.111-112, Somers Heidhues, Banka Tin, 
p.41, Sugihara, Kaoru. 'Patterns of Chinese Emigration to Southeast Asia, 1869-1939', in: Sugihara, Kaoru (ed.). 
Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949, (New York NY, 2005), p.254-258
23 McKeown, Adam, 'Chinese Emigration in Global Context, 1850-1940.' in: Journal of Global History Vol.5  
(Cambridge, 2010), p.96, 101-103, Kuhn,Chinese Amongst Others, p.211-213
24 McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.102, Kuhn, Chinese Amongst Others, p.124, 222, Wang, China, p.6
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general standard for people labelled as coolie in the 19th century. Coolies were simply temporary 
migrant labourers taking risks to seek profit abroad when their home nation could not give it to 
them. Striking is the example of a construction order issued by the general government of the Dutch 
Indies wherein was spoken in terms of attracting some coolies to repair the bridge in Surabaya 
rather than just ordering them. Coolie in this regard was used as an synonym for day labourer.25
As coolie went from a neutral term to normative concept in modern times, the term “indentured 
labourer” has  been winning ground to emphasize  the difference.  While  coolie  has  a  remaining 
connotation of semi-slavery, “indentured labourer” has a more neutral tone accompanying it. Both 
terms  have  in  essence  the  same  definition,  yet  the  difference  lies  in  how they are  perceived. 
Indentured labour was based on an old Chinese tradition of financing overseas travel. While citing 
Count of Hogendorp's Coup d'oeil sur Java, the governor-general of the Dutch Indies mentions for 
instance that most of the travel expenses of new Chinese immigrants were paid by Chinese residents 
of Batavia. The new arrival would pay off their benefactor during their stay and in the meantime get 
accustomed to life on Java. Coolies however were part of the new migrants streams of the late 19 th 
century of temporary labourers, and could therefore be set apart as one of the troubles of modernity. 
This method of using the terminology bypasses the problem of the normative perception whilst at 
the same time emphasises the difference between traditional and modern (in this case 19 th century 
modern) migration. One major problem of this approach however is that it is meant to clarify the 
problem yet prolongs the misconception about coolie labour in general. Nevertheless using these 
two terms in this way in relation to each other, offers the best tools to draw a clear picture of the 
situation.26
Initially only a hypothesis from the 1950's about the Chinese migration to the U.S. in the early 
20th century, the concept of “sojourning” has shed new light on migration. Sojourning is temporary 
migration yet for period longer than season migration entails. The migrant can be living abroad 
earning money for several years before returning to his home nation. This is precisely where the 
crux lies of the concept of sojourning, it is hard to determine if a migrant intended to go back after 
several  years  or  had  different  reasons  for  returning  after  wilfully  settling  permanently abroad. 
Because intention is central in determining the category of the migrant, rather than his actual action, 
it remains difficult for the historian to reconstruct sojourner behaviour.27
In  1991  Wang  Gungwu proposed  to  categorise  overseas  Chinese  in  a  variety  of  migratory 
patterns. These patterns could coexist next to each other in one particular period of time, as they 
25 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën, 1850-1900, nummer toegang 2.10.02, no. 7115, fol.383
26 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën, 1814-1849, nummer toegang 2.10.01, no. 3042, fol.13-14
27 McKeown, Adam. Melancholy Order – Asian migration and the globalization at borders, (New York NY, 2008), 
Wang, 'Sojourning', p.7-9
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represented a portion out of the total overseas Chinese migration during that period. Therefore the 
total Chinese migration in different time periods, would consist out of variable percentages of each 
migratory  pattern  treated  in  this  model.  The  categorisation  of  actors  over  time  would  clarify 
changes and disruptions in the flow of Chinese migration overseas. Sojourners were one category of 
migrant in this thesis and decisively unique for the Chinese according to Wang Gungwu.28
Since his research was primarily aimed at Southeast Asia and the Chinese presence there, the 
model proposed by Wang Gungwu functions best is this region. Besides the trader, the coolie and 
the  re-migrant  patterns,  he  claims  the  sojourning  pattern  is  essential  in  understanding  Chinese 
migratory practices. Familial piety to the family unit in China was central in this form of migration. 
Sons would go overseas to make a living while sending remittances back to their familial house in 
China. After several years overseas they would return home as they had accumulated enough wealth 
to support a family unit in China themselves. Since emigration of women was formally forbidden in 
Qing China until 1893, this model fits with the temporary labour force in the Nanyang.29
Even so the assumption that all migration of Chinese to the Nanyang was initially temporary, is 
solely based on intent. The civil ideal in China indeed consisted of a man who would pay respect to 
his elders and honour them by returning to his familial house during their old days. In practice 
however, this not always happened. While Wang Gungwu admits that there were Chinese men who 
remained in Southeast Asia, he poses them as unable to return to China for whichever reason, not 
unwilling. Wrongly so I presume, as ideals are not universally carried by all in society.30
In the western migratory history, scholars tend to go approach the subject in terms of action 
rather than intent. This often leads to misunderstandings with scholars like Wang Gungwu, as both 
make use of the same vocabulary yet have a different notion of approaching terms as sojourning. 
For instance while a migrant for the 'intentional' school is sojourner by departure, the 'action' school 
only categorizes the migrant by his actions on arrival at his destination. According to them, not until 
the same migrant returns can he be labelled as a sojourner. While those who focus on intent rather 
than  action,  will  only  change  the  label  if  the  migrants  intentions  change  on  arrival.  When 
emphasizing 'action' the entire travel history of the migrant is taken into account to label him. When 
'intent' is the central theme, one movement is the preferred mode of analysis to label the migrant.
These different methodologies make it difficult to compare migratory histories and the position 
Chinese take in them. Adam McKeown tries to compare migrations in the modern era on a global 
scale. He states that return rates for other large scale migrations, such as transatlantic European 
labour migration in the 19th century, has similar return rates as Chinese migration during the same 
28 Wang, China, p.4-7
29 Wang, China, p.185, Wang, Chinese Overseas, p.4
30 Wang, Chinese Overseas, p.44
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period  and  thus  concludes  that  sojourning  is  not  unique  for  the  Chinese  case.  Technological 
innovation, making transport faster and cheaper, provided migrants with more possibilities to return, 
for  instance  during  a  decline  in  economic  growth in  particular  region.  The cultural  dimension 
played just minor role in the choice made concerning migration.31
Networks and Connections
Overseas Chinese have been subject to a political discussion in most of the Southeast Asian 
nations since their independence. Fears for a potential communist influence and purely nationalistic 
concerns  were  the  primary  causes  of  this.  During  the  Cold  War  people  in  Southeast  Asian 
governments were extra suspicious as the Chinese minority might turn out to be a communist a fifth 
column. In Indonesia president Suharto in 1967 even went as far as prohibiting Chinese cultural 
expressions  and  'encouraging'  dropping  Chinese  sounding  surnames  within  the  population. 
Although at that time these policies were more rhetorical measures than a solutions, the actions 
coming  from  government,  clearly  shows  the  widespread  mistrust  towards  the  Chinese  as 
community.32
Although the Chinese as a minority have been made into a political problem for a period of time, 
decent scientific research on the overseas Chinese has been lacking. It was not until the 1990's that 
a comparison between the multitude of Chinese communities living in the Nanyang was made. The 
primary  cause  of  this  lay  with  the  vast  territory  the  region  covers.  A region  with  different 
governments, cultures, languages and an uneven distribution of the Chinese minority amongst the 
lands.  With  the  advent  of  digital  technology such  research  questions  became  now possible  to 
examine.33
Technological progress was not the only reason for the renewed interest in the overseas Chinese. 
With the new economic path China had chosen after the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and the 
definite collapse communism with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the primary hesitation of 
overseas Chinese to profile themselves as such was gone. The economic success of China after the 
long years under Mao also made many Chinese living in Southeast Asia rejuvenate their cultural 
heritage.34
Nonetheless the concepts used to describe the spread of Chinese throughout the region are not 
generally  accepted.  The  term  to  describe  the  current  situation  of  dispersed  overseas  Chinese 
throughout the Nanyang and the the process how this situation came to be, even is subject to debate. 
31 McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.105-108
32 Lockard, Southeast Asia, p.162-163, McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p. 335-348
33 Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese', Wang, China, p.15
34 Pan (ed.), Encyclopedia, p.58, McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.349
18
“Diaspora” covers the whole movement yet the term has its drawbacks. The moral connotation in 
the west concerning the Jewish diaspora and the dramatic consequences of of the Nazi regime in the 
1940's is the primary one. Since the 1990's the term has been normalized in scholarly circles to 
entail simply the dispersal of a people with a shared origin. Nevertheless the distinction between a 
moralistic approach and a technical approach of this term is imminent to consider when using it.35
If the term will be used in a strictly technical sense a more detailed definition is necessary. As 
diaspora also has moral connotations it is essential to narrow down the concept to its core and leave 
little to the beholder to fill in. For instance the term implies that the nation or peoples do not have a  
territorial home or state to live, a characteristic that the Chinese of course do not share with most 
other diasporas. Secondly the term suggest some connections between these dispersed communities 
and a possible common aim. While Chinese emigrants only share a similar cultural heritage on a 
very elementary level. It suggests an unity were there is none. Therein lies the essence of the debate 
about the use of diaspora as a term to describe the Chinese spread in Southeast Asia.36
 The before mentioned Wang Gungwu specialises in the field of Chinese diaspora in Southeast 
Asia but prefers the term “overseas Chinese” to describe the movement. He argues that the term 
diaspora also implies an interconnectedness between settlements at different places. It were these 
accusations that made life in the 20th century for the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, quite 
hard. To be perceived as being unified with some extra-territorial community can easily turn to a 
position completely outside local society. An unwanted and vulnerable position as the anti-Chinese 
riots in Jakarta in 1998 testified.37
Nevertheless Adam McKeown has advocated the continued the use of diaspora as a term as it 
highlights transnational  connections.  The settlement  of Chinese overseas and their  communities 
cannot be fully understood if you leave out the connections oversea, he argues. The fact that these 
communities still showed the characteristics of being Chinese  several centuries after founding is 
proof enough of that. There exist a high probability that the cause of this preservation of cultural 
heritage was made possible by a frequent connection to the cultural source, in this case China.38
Between these two perspectives on the use of the term diaspora lies again a different starting 
point of reasoning. While Wang Gungwu uses a diaspora as a descriptive term that could have 
implications  on  the  current  social  outlook  of  Chinese  minorities,  McKeown  uses  diaspora  as 
approach to display the transnational element existing in these communities. Wang Gungwu uses 
the  traditional  way  of  the  concept  of  diaspora  while  Adam  McKeown  argues  for  a  neutral, 
35 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.308-309
36 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.308-309, Wang, 'Sojourning', p.2, 11
37 McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p. 347, Wang, Chinese Overseas, p.64
38 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.307
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methodological form of the term. For both discourses arguments can be given a historical point of 
view.
Ironically the use of diaspora to designate the spread of Chinese across Southeast Asia has a 
longer history than the actual study of the phenomenon. In 1914 the Thai king Vajiravudh already 
labelled the Chinese as “The Jews of the East”. The same characteristics used to slander the Jews in 
the west often were also applied on the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Their commercial success was 
envied by those who were less successful yet were native to the region. And not only those who 
were indigenous, Europeans were often also suspicious of Chinese practices within their colonial 
territories.39
Yet the use of diaspora as a way to analyse connections between communities across the sea and 
examine their influence on cultural backgrounds, is not an entirely new approach. It bears striking 
resemblances with Braudels work on the Mediterranean World and the connections that were forged 
over the sea lanes. Not only interaction with people of the surrounding lands built a community but 
also the connections across the waves were integral to establishing community values and practise. 
That this perspective on trading communities as the Chinese was somewhat understood, how poorly 
and pragmatic it may have been, by persons throughout history can be noticed many times in the 
chronicles  of  Batavia.  The importance  of  the  Chinese  living  there  and the  overseas  trade  they 
brought was mentioned repeatedly and proved to be essential to the economic prosperity of Batavia, 
as Leonard Blussé convincingly argued in his leading work on Chinese in Batavia during VOC 
times: Strange Company.40
For this thesis I will mainly use diaspora in the methodological sense, as I will be focussing on a 
transnational network in an era where political boundaries in the archipelago were vague at best. 
Diaspora will only be used to signify the dispersal of people with a similar cultural heritage, not to 
assume  any  interconnectedness  between  communities  beforehand.  The  political  connections 
referred to only began to organise during the early 20th century when pan-Chinese movement gained 
ground, a period outside the scope oft his thesis. The diasporic approach fits the emphasis of this 
thesis on marine connections and has gained recognition in recent years in literature as an useful 
analytical tool. However I will be fully aware of the historic usage of the term diaspora and any 
connotations that come with the term.
39 Kuhn, Chinese Amongst Others, p.161, McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.328, Wang, 'Sojourning', p.11
40 Blussé, Leonard. Strange Company – Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia, (Dordrecht,  
1986), Braudel, Fernand. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 3rd edition, 
(Berkeley CA, 1995)
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The research done on Chinese minorities living in Southeast Asia can be roughly divided in 
three types of modes of analysis. A purely local or national perspective; an economical perspective 
that can have either a national or regional focus on Chinese entrepreneurs and business; and a social 
perspective that emphasizes the cultural  and familial  ties to China.  Between these three groups 
some overlap evidently exists. However the emphasis of most essays or books in general, covers 
subjects within these categories without venturing much further outside this partition. Because of 
this division, slightly differing methods have been developed to perceive and analyse the Chinese 
minority.
First  of  the  local  or  national  perspective.  This  perspective  covers  research  on  the  Chinese 
minorities  within  contemporary boundaries.  They are  either  made  part  or  excluded  from local 
society yet when excluded, the foreign element is only mentioned in general terms. Often written 
after the decolonization period after the Second World War these historical narratives are primarily 
concerned  with  nationbuilding  and  legitimizing  governmental  power.  In  this  approach  legal 
boundaries divide the world and therefore limit the narrative being told. This form of historical 
narration is hardly uncommon as most states that exist on this globe have similar stories to form 
unity.  However  a  much  seen  weakness  of  these  national  narratives  concerns  containing  a 
teleological  element  and therefore oversimplifying  historical  reality.  As a  distinct  group with a 
cultural heritage bound to a homeland elsewhere, a Chinese minority often posed a problem for 
these  accounts.  Fitting  Chinese  as  a  community  within  national  society  and  these  national 
narratives, usually depended on their integration and influence in the new governments that sprung 
up after European decolonisation.41
The second mode of analysis, an economical one, aims to map and describe the commercial 
success of the Chinese within Southeast Asia. It tries to understand why the Chinese as a group was 
and is, relatively successful compared to the indigenous people of Southeast Asia. The large amount 
of commercial traders within the group is deemed essential in this regard. How international trade 
interrelates to local Chinese trade and craftsmanship is one of the main discussion points of this  
economical approach. Commercial connections are mapped to examine if therein lay the secret to 
their success. These studies usually contain an all encompassing economic overview for the region 
that  often  tend  to  remain  abstract  or  take  a  particular  segment  of  the  economy (whether  in  a 
territorial framework or one particular business) and examine that in greater detail.42
To achieve  an overview of  economic  connections  a  model  is  created wherein  some central 
points represent entrepôts or large transit markets. These mainhubs take care of the majority of trade 
41 McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.323-324, 347, Suryadinata, Ethnic Chinese, p.125
42 McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.319-320, 347-349, for instance: Hodder, Rupert. Merchant Princes of the East –  
Cultural Delusions, Economic Success and the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, (Chichester, 1996)
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and  represent  the  main  trading  lanes  on  regional  and  international  scale.  The  mainhubs  are 
connected to several final destinations of produce, as well as to secondary hubs that serve as a local 
commercial centres. Occasionally another subhub is formed to serve an even smaller or product 
specific  market,  to  which  producers  as  well  as  retailers  are  linked.  From this  fractal  web  of 
mainhubs, secondary hubs etc.,  intermediary connections are forged between points representing 
markets within this web. However most of the trade lanes these connections represent, usually are 
attracted  to  the  major  hubs  within  this  economical  web.  To  see  which  position  Chinese 
entrepreneurs take within these numerous trade connections and marketplaces, is a difficult task and 
often stalls by lack of reliable information.
The last mode of analysis I want to treat concisely here, is the one that emphasizes the social  
element. The perseverance and survival of Chinese cultural heritage abroad and the connection that 
often  remained  with  the  familial  village  in  China  receive  particular  attention.  Through  these 
connections the early Chinese migrants used to travel to their destination in the Nanyang. When the 
number of these migratory flows increased during the 19th century, the organisations that made this 
increase  possible  were  built  upon years  of  expertise  of  transporting  earlier  migrants.  That  the 
overseas link with China was seldom severed, is a central theme in studies concerning the social  
built up of Chinese communities overseas.43
As the  linkage  to  China  and  the  familial  village,  is  assumed  to  be  essential  in  preserving 
Chinese cultural heritage for Chinese communities abroad, some models are created to give form to 
this idea. Philip Kuhn calls these personal linkages to China corridors through where family affairs, 
whether  financial  or  private,  could be  handled.  Through these lines  contact  was preserved and 
assimilation  of  the  Chinese  community abroad was naturally blocked.  As these  corridors  were 
mostly personal certain institutions were made at transit points to bundle these individual straws. At 
sea harbours that often were one of these transit points, people and later specialised organisations, 
were created to retain overseas contact. These harbours were the departure and arrival ports through 
which  migrants  travelled  and  thus  also  served  as  a  connecting  node.  From  these  harbours 
connections radiated outward to persons and communities further inland.  The migrant harbours 
were central  points  in  this  model  where the connections  were bundled together.  Through these 
corridors social contact remained possible despite distance.44 
43 Kuhn, Chinese Amongst Others, p.153-196, Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese', p.51-93
44 Kuhn, Chinese Amongst Others, p.43
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Figure 2: Examples of economic network model and social network model.
One major problem of these perspectives is their tendency to the limit scope of reasoning and 
remain within established boundaries. Albeit practical for analytical purposes these models must not 
transform into obstacles of research. To break through these theoretical walls so to speak, I propose 
merging these models. While the purely national approach is not preferable, it is the most practical 
way to research pieces of the network as information is primarily stored according to present day 
national boundaries. While I am proposing to research a particular segment of an overseas network 
of  Chinese,  i.e.  the  potential  transformation  of  Chinese  merchants  enterprise  from  cargo  to 
passengers transport, I unfortunately have to limit myself to Batavia.
Nevertheless the economic network model, aimed at traders, and social network model, aimed at 
migrant  family  ties,  can  be  willingly  combined.  While  the  economic  model  in  abstract  form 
resembles a web, the model aimed at social ties is far more linear in abstract shape (see figure 2).  
This difference does not have to be an obstacle. The economic network model leaves room for 
intermediate  connections  between  subhubs  and  the  social  network  model  acknowledges  the 
existence  of  central  transit  points.  As  both  models  emphasize  different  elements  of  overseas 
connections  for  their  respective  analytical  purposes  these  alternative  options  are  somewhat 
neglected in their observations.
The main difference lies in extent of the network; while Chinese merchants potentially visited 
every settlement where a profit could be made, Chinese migrants tended to cluster together. Even 
small production colonies as tin mines and woodcutter camps in scarcely populated frontier regions, 
were started as mostly heterogeneously Chinese group endeavours. Primarily a practical decision 
concerning trust and safety issues when settling in a foreign environment.
However by looking at the differences between these two models made for analytical purposes 
one must not forget that the models are only tools for research, not a complete representation of 
historical realities. The Chinese migrants travelling to the Nanyang made use of the same marine 
infrastructure as Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia, therefore the division made by these models 
is purely a theoretical one. My hypothesis suggest to examine a combination of the two models in 
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regards to the last segment of the overseas connection, the destination port in Southeast Asia. Did 
Chinese merchants that transported passengers to Batavia instead of only cargo.
3. Transferral of Trade
The 19th century was a period of remarkable change for Southeast Asia and indeed, the world. 
Not only were the ramifications of the industrial revolution in Europe felt in the region, in the 
process that Pomeranz dubbed the “great divergence”, massive changes took places in the social and 
economic positions of the traditional powers in Asia. Policies that lasted the centuries, with some 
minor variations, could not cope with the new situation that presented itself. Economy became the 
primary language of diplomatic affairs and the seas the new arena of confrontation.45
Southeast Asia and east Asia had contact with Europeans since times long gone. Small trade 
settlements or colonies were scattered across the islands. Chinese traders had long lasting trade 
connections  to  these  settlements  and  the  port  city  of  Canton  was  opened  as  market  place  for 
European traders coming for Chinese wares. The Mandarin bureaucracy deemed that was enough 
contact between imperial China and the western barbarians. The economic contact that existed was 
on Chinese terms, both politically as economically.46
The relation China had with the outside world changed dramatically during the 19 th century. I 
suggest  three  arbitrary  categories  to  look  at  this  transformation  in  this  chapter  and  provide  a 
glossary of  the  macro  economic  developments  that  influenced the  relation  China  had with  the 
world. By using  these three angles an intermingled but hopefully clear picture will appear. First off 
an internal perspective, the domestic changes in Qing China concerning the economy; secondly the 
external influences on Chinese trade consisting mostly  changes brought by Europeans incursions; 
and thirdly an intermediate obstacle for all traders alike, the massive surge of piracy in Southeast 
Asian waters along the major trade lanes.47
45 Pomeranz, Kenneth. The Great Divergence – China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy,  
(Princeton NJ, 2000)
46 Guosheng, Huang. 'The Chinese Maritime Customs in Transition, 1750-1830', in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong 
(eds.). Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850, (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.170, Keller, Wolfgang, Ben Li and Shiue 
Carol H. 'China's Foreign Trade: Perpectives From the Past 150 Years', in: The World Economy Vol.34 no.6, (Oxford, 
2011), p.858-859, Reid, Anthony. ‘Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia’, 
in: Anthony Reid & Kristine Aliluna-Rodgers (eds.). Sojourners and Settlers – Histories of Southeast Asia and the  
Chinese, (St. Leonards, 1996), p.45, Wang, Chinese Overseas, p.36
47 Brown, Ian. 'Imperialism, Trade and Investment in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries', in: John G. 
Butcher & Howard W. Dick (eds.). The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming – Business Elites and the Emergence of  
the Modern State in Southeast Asia, (New York NY, 1993), p.80, Murray, 'Piracy', p.52
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With the start of the 19th century China's trade balance remained positive as it had been for 
centuries. In China's domestic market only a small demand for imported products existed and thus 
Chinese wares remained craved after by foreign merchants in maritime trade. The internal Chinese 
market  usually  had  only  a  small  need  for  foreign  goods,  as  most  products  were  available 
domestically. Her imports consisted from small luxuries, pepper and spices, colouring agents such 
as indigo and delicacies as tropical fruits and edible birds-nests. And those products were usually 
imported by Chinese merchant junks. Foreign traders mostly were dependent on bullion to buy their 
supply of porcelain, silk and tea from China.48
During the late 18th and early 19th century  the trade balance slowly shirted. The large population 
growth and already intensive agrarian land use in southern China made the demand for rice increase 
dramatically. Rice needed to be imported from elsewhere en masse to cope with the rising demand. 
Southeast Asia became one of China's main suppliers. The contents of the trade lane to the Nanyang 
tranformed  from a diverse scope of imports to mainly bulk transport. Europeans however stayed 
out of this trade as they found a different product to trade with China besides bullion: opium.49
One position to consider concerning trade it the one of the ruling imperial bureaucracy took. In 
their education Mandarins were taught in the principles of what we now consider neo-confucianism. 
In this doctrine individuals in society were categorised in hierarchical order according to their worth 
to the community. Merchants and traders stood at the base of the pyramid, below even peasants on 
the land, as traders did not actually produce anything, only moved produce of others. It was deemed 
a profession of low esteem by many in the imperial court. Besides this low appreciation merchants 
were also considered a security risk because of the  boundaries they crossed. As there was no way to 
track their activities overseas, their line of work was greeted with a certain degree of suspicion. Not 
entirely without  reason as  in the past  precedents  had occurred where merchant  families turned 
against the government.50
There existed some leniency towards the merchants in south China that were trading with the 
Nanyang. Primarily because of the efforts of the provincial government of the southern provinces 
that understood the importance of the trade for their local economy. These had enough influence, 
partially because of the large tax payments to Beijing,  to persuade the imperial  bureaucracy to 
allow international trade to persist. The power to push their own policies through did not to the 
48 Verslag van den Handel, Scheepvaart en Inkomende en Uitgaande Regten op Java en Madura, 1825 (Batavia, 
1827), Keller, 'Foreign Trade', p.859
49 Tana, Li. 'Rice from Saigon: The Singapore Chinese and the Saigon Trade of the 19th Century', in: Wang Gungwu & 
Ng Chin-keong (eds.). Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850, (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.261, Wang, Chinese 
Overseas, p.36-37
50 For instance Zheng Chenggong (in western sources referred to as Coxinga) who resisted the Manchu conquest for 
several years, came from merchant family, 
Wang, Chinese Overseas, p.32, Murray, 'Piracy', p.44
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extent the could completely govern themselves in the south, as some scholars assume. Yet it did 
simply mean that the influence of the southern coast provinces was higher than those of comparable 
sized inland provinces because of the sheer size of their tax contribution. Further autonomy came 
not until after the Opium Wars and the weakening of power of the imperial court during the latter 
half of the 19th century.51
However one major change concerning towards merchants took place before that. In 1825 the 
Hongze embankments at the Grand Canal collapsed. The capital city Being in the north where the 
imperial court was settled, was dependent on the flow of tribute rice through this canal. The disaster  
that struck the Grand Canal was of such magnitude that alternative options needed to be considered. 
A coastal route to transport the rice to the north was put into action. For this endeavour a multitude 
of ships were necessary, more than the Imperial fleet could miss. The Daoguang Emperor turned to 
the private sector on advice of his inner court advisor Yinghe. For now 1,5 to 1,6 million  shi of 
rice52 would be transported by sea. The coastal transport system proved to outlast the reconstruction 
works on the Grand Canal and became a regular secondary route.53
This experiment affected the merchant centres in south China in three ways. Initially only the 
merchants located in Shanghai profited from the assignment but soon transporters from the south 
understood that they could just as easy bypass Shanghai and transport the rice themselves to the 
northern shores. Secondly the assignment was given by government offices, that meant a partial 
reconciliation of the treatment for the position as merchant. Thirdly the work was highly profitable. 
Besides the fee the government paid for the rice transport traders could keep 20% of their cargo 
hold  for  their  own trade,  plus  this  cargo would  not  be  taxed in  the  northern  and intermediate  
harbours.54
This northern trading zone quickly expanded its market to other product groups as Manchuria 
became an area of Chinese immigration and development. The opening of Japan by commodore 
Perry in 1853  gave another impulse to the development of northern trade. Previous Chinese trade 
also  was  contained  similarly  as  Dutch  trade  had  been  to  Dejima.  The  new  unrestricted  trade 
provided  many  opportunities  for  entrepreneurs  especially  after  the  Meji  restoration  in  1868. 
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Following the stipulations of the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876, the zone was expanded with the 
'hermit kingdom' Korea as it also opened its doors for other things than ceremonial diplomatic trade 
with the Chinese Empire.55
Figure 3: Model of trading zones of Chinese merchants mid 19th century.
By the start of the 19th century European interest in Asia was reinvigorated. In 1815 the final 
accord of the Napoleonic Wars had been played at Waterloo and finally the interest of European 
powers could focus once again on their overseas possessions. They provided a solution for internal 
European tribulations getting once more out of hand. Many Europeans powers started to expand the 
colonies they possessed, as well as the administrative grip they had on them. The United Kingdom 
returned the  Dutch  possessions  in  Asia  but  in  return  got  hold of  key harbours  in  the  Strait  of 
Malacca, which in turn became know as the Straits Settlement. The Dutch also began to expand 
their control over the Indonesian archipelago. Still the British managed to establish a protectorate 
over Sabah and Sarawak on the northern coast of Borneo mid 19th century. The Spanish moved 
southward  from the  island  of  Luzon to  gain  control  over  the  entire  territory of  the  Philippine 
islands. After years of supporting indigenous leaders the French finally took direct formal control 
55 Furata, Kazuko, 'Kobe seen as part of the Shanghai Trading Network: The Role of Chinese Merchants in the Re-
export of Cotton Manufactures to Japan', in: Sugihara, Kaoru (ed.). Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian 
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over Indo-China (current Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) after a war won versus the Qing Empire in 
1884.56
Beyond this territorial expansion in Southeast Asia also the commercial expansion of European 
powers struck the region. While in Europe itself the trade measures of mercantilism slowly died out 
in favour of those of the free trade doctrine, in Asia a different situation presented itself. European 
powers were reluctant to open up to free trade in their  colonies as state power was not firmly 
founded in local society. When free trade was accepted in colonial possession it mostly consisted of 
bilateral treaties between allies and solely for other 'developed' nations. A group basically formed by 
Europe, their overseas possessions and the United States. An exception on this situation was British 
Singapore which was founded on the principle of being a free trade harbour.57
For  the  Chinese  merchants  operating  from the  southern  shores  of  China  this  mercantilistic 
approach posed a problem. In the 18th century they lost their hegemonic position as traders in the 
region as European traders had gained a firmer ground. While both European and Chinese trade 
networks  were symbiotic  at  first,  a specialisation had come about  that  brought  Chinese traders 
mostly  serving  the  independent  indigenous  kingdoms  and  sultanates  in  the  Nanyang,  and  the 
Europeans  trading  amongst  themselves  and  as  exception  the  city  of  Canton,  China.  With  the 
expansion of territorial power of Europeans in the region Chinese merchants increasingly found 
themselves  outmatched by either  cheaper  products  or  unfair  tolls  and import  fees  collected by 
European colonial governments.58
 The introduction of steam powered ships in the region brought further havoc to the traditional 
trading practice of Chinese merchants. Albeit expensive, these ships could sail any time of the year 
and  not  just  in  the  two  annual  monsoon  periods  the  wind  powered  junks  operated.  The  time 
consuming and risky hinging closely to coast the sail powered ships had as alternative was barely a 
viable  option.  As  timely  deliveries  were  the  preferred  mode  of  logistics  in  the  industrial  era, 
Chinese merchants saw their commercial opportunities in the Nanyang quickly diminish. However 
this  only  was  true  when  operating  from  southern  China.  An  increasing  amount  of  Chinese 
merchants settled in Southeast Asia to operate their businesses creating a Chinese diaspora in the 
region. Shipbuilding and repair could easily be done in forest rich archipelago and trade information 
reached the right ears quicker when closer to the market.59
In  the  trading  zone  to  the  south  the  traditional  Chinese  position  started  to  crack.  Chinese 
merchants  settled  their  business  in  Southeast  Asia  for  example  Siam  (current  Thailand)  or 
56 Brown, 'Imperialism', p.80-82, Lockard, Southeast Asia, p.102-104, Taylor, Social World, p.130 
57 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no. 3042, fol.72-76, Haan Psz., P. de. Het Handelstelsel van Java met  
Koophandel, Scheepvaart en Fabrijkstaat van Nederland, in verband gebragt, (Leyden, 1825), p.8-13
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28
Singapore while their  counterparts in south China went bankrupt or changed markets.  Some of 
these  Chinese  businesses  in  the  Nanyang  focussed  on  the  smaller  second  hand  trade  in  the 
archipelago. Other specialised in gross sale of bulk goods to south China, while the other trade 
shifted to European merchants. Rice trade along the coast remained firmly in Chinese hands. This 
changed the southern trading zone as it shrank to encompass only this coastal bulk trade, while in 
Southeast  Asia  a  new trading zone developed in which Chinese traders  operated (see figure 3,
page 26).60
A major reason why the direct trade of China collapsed was the intense competition of European 
traders. Although these European rivals were confined to the city of Canton it was attractive to do 
the same business there without the risks of venturing out. As the demand was high in Europe,  
prices were good. Secondly the risk of maritime travel in a tropical zone was carried by someone 
else. Thirdly remaining within imperial China both insured the merchant from getting banned from 
entering again by new regulation as happened occasionally in the past. But it also kept up higher 
social standing as they were perceived more as a loyal subject to the emperor and less as a 'despised' 
trader.61 
This pleasant situation would not last as the Chinese Empire was introduced to massive amounts 
of opium. Already known in the Empire as highly addictive yet medical applicable, recreational use 
was made difficult by limiting imports and by the effect this regulation had on the price that had to 
be paid for illegal import. The usage of opium skyrocketed when the price dropped by deliveries of 
mainly British firms to Chinese smugglers.  To an extent the positive trade balance and internal 
currency of China based on silver became at risk by the outflow of bullion and the imerial court 
decided to step in. In 1838 Lin Zexu was sent to Canton to stamp out both Chinese gangs of drug  
dealers as the foreign firms that provided them with merchandise. After the refusal of foreign firms 
to hand over their stock voluntarily he proceeded to the crude measure of stopping all trade and 
surrounding the  refusing  traders  with  armed men to  forcefully  let  them abide  to  Chinese  law. 
Eventually the foreigners surrendered but the incident had far reaching consequences.62 
It is not entirely clear which information about the incident reached London exactly yet the 
report is suspected to have highly emphasized the blocked trade and the repossession of British 
goods by the Chinese government. The use of opium was still not banned in the United Kingdom 
itself at that time which might have induced more misunderstandings. In June 1840 the British fleet 
and army arrived in Canton and started their reprisal attacks. Aided by the technological superiority 
of their arms, British forces defeated Qing armies swiftly and occupied the region. By 1842 the 
60 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no. 3042, fol.13b-14, Tana, 'Rice', p.261-263
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Qing Emperor  signed the Treaty of Nanking were he ceded Hong Kong, paid an indemnity to 
Britain  and  opened  another  four  ports  to  foreign  trade  besides  Canton.  The  treaty  was  later 
supplemented by an extraterritoriality clause that gave British citizens the right to be tried under 
British law when on Chinese soil.  In 1844 France and the United States followed with similar 
treaties.63
An uneasy situation arose where foreign trade and economical incursions on Chinese territory 
were larger than ever before. However, the imperial bureaucracy was not completely brushed aside 
and actively worked against further degeneration of their legal position. As it were, there existed 
two legal systems besides each other in the treaty ports. Unfortunately this situation made for an 
ideal recipe for all sorts of clandestine operations making use of both legal systems.64 
By 1856 another  incident  occurred  when a  Chinese  ship  that  was  suspected  of  piracy was 
renamed to “Arrow” and hoisted the British flag.  What  was a  case for  the Chinese authorities 
suddenly became a case in which they did not have any legal power because of the extraterritoriality 
clause in the earlier treaty. The crew nonetheless was incarcerated as the nationality permit of the 
ship  had  previously  expired.  An  argument  ensued  between  British  and  Chinese  officials  but 
eventually the crew was released by the Chinese guards. However as there was no apology given, 
governor of Hong Kong, John Bowring ordered bombarding of city of Canton and its defences. 
Even though the start of hostilities was not seen as legitimate by many, it was deemed that there was 
no  way back.  The  French  joined  the  British  with  the  defense  that  they  needed  revenge  for  a 
murdered missionary in China. Faced with the Taiping revolt on one hand and the western military 
threat on the other the Qing court surrendered without much battle. The Treaties of Tientsin were 
ratified  in 1860 with Britain, France, Russia and the U.S. In one clause opium trade became now 
permitted and the product became a symbol of the economic origins of the war. Ten more cities 
were opened to foreign trade, as well as the great rivers for foreign vessels. Subsequently foreign 
traders were allowed further inland. Custom duties were lowered once more and the collection of 
these duties now became a task of western agencies alone. A multitude of other demands were made 
that are less relevant to this thesis yet the few mentioned here make it clear that the Qing lost most 
of their power to wield an independent economic policy.65
For the Chinese merchants located on the southern China coast this meant they had suddenly to 
compete with Europeans or adjust to the new circumstances. Traditional junk trade powered by 
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wind was rapidly diminishing:  in  the  period  1820 to 1850 there still  existed  over  3000 junks; 
between 1850 and 1860 this number declined to about in 2000; and by 1873 only about 400 junks 
remained  in  action.  It  was  understood  by  Qing  officials  that  western  power  came  from  a 
combination of technological advances and commercial nationalism. As changing economic policy 
to stimulate Chinese companies was not longer an option after 1860, the only way forward was 
creating a Chinese steamship business. Qing officials opted for a joint venture between government 
and the private sector. Private entrepreneurs however, were reluctant to invest in the endeavour out 
of fear of harming their business relations with western trading companies. Those relations had 
saved them from bankruptcy while this project still had to prove itself. The gradual progress of 
negotiating between private and public parties made Chinese steamship lines slow to develop to 
serve as an alternative to western shipping.66
There are revisionist scholars that contest this view as overly negative. They tend to emphasize 
the increase of available products on the Chinese market. Often they neglect to mention that these 
products  mostly  originated  abroad  and  were  imported  under  imposed  and  for  those  times 
unnaturally low custom duties. A more interesting perspective however comes from Man-houng 
Lin.  He states that opium use proved to be an opportunity for the poorer inland provinces.  By 
cultivating low grade opium and selling their harvest to the dense population centres on the coast,  
rural and commercial China were linked in a trade relation that would have otherwise not existed.  
This would form, until the renewed prohibition of opium during the 1910's, an interconnected and 
more evenly developing Chinese economy. A fascinating new perspective on the effects opium trade 
had on China.67
Nevertheless for the unemployed population living on the coast, this development brought little 
to improve their situation. Their other option was working with the new circumstances. Even as 
western companies had the capital and the technology to put Chinese merchants out of business, 
still some niches remained for the Chinese. While the logistical part was covered by westerns the 
actual signing of trade agreements in China remained difficult for westerners. Few of them had the 
experience and human capital already in their companies to operate on the extensive local markets 
or even speak the language(s). This was an opportunity for local Chinese traders, as  organising 
trade not the actual transferring produce, became their business.
A major problem during the first half of the 19th century was the rise of piracy in the South 
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China  Sea.  Before  continuing on describing these problems there  is  one thing to  consider,  the 
completely different nature of piracy in Asia compared to the piracy committed in the Caribbean or 
that of Mediterranean corsairs. Piracy in Southeast Asia was often just a side business of 'seagoing' 
people. Often they provided themselves with the acts of piracy of extra income, while the rest of 
year they held themselves busy with more noble activities such as trading or fishing. For the ships 
they used it was therefore necessary to be capable to be quickly converted into regular ships. As 
these ships were usually small, fast and without many guns, blades were the weapon of choice. 
Crews of taken ships were usually overwhelmed by number of pirates.68
To give some insight in the different kinds of piracy in Southeast Asia it is practical to make a  
distinction between organised and disorganised piracy. This distinction is of course fairly theoretic 
as the level of organisation varied in time or even per raid. Nevertheless for analysing purposes, it is 
useful to pinpoint differences between the pirate centres spotted throughout the sea and how they 
operated. 
Organised pirates would have large fleets to patrol trade lanes in search of potential victims. The 
loot was a vital component of income for the families back at their hideouts. A modus operandi that 
bears more resemblances to the nomad raids out of Central Asia than the methods of their Caribbean 
counterparts. The disorganised type usually were opportunists. Teams that were mostly formed on 
familial or village basis attacked only in small numbers when the odds were in their favour. The 
income they derived from loot was usually supplementary on their daily needs that were provided 
by their fishing activities.
The late 18th and early 19th century knew several sophisticated pirate fleets near Tonkin,  the 
island of Hainan and the Chinese border on the mainland. As the seas were considered outside 
jurisdiction of the Chinese government,  they initially did nothing versus these pirates. It  was a 
private matter of merchants to arm themselves outside Chinese waters as in Chinese harbours they 
were safe as there were no weapons allowed. Anyone sailing the seas was primarily viewed as a 
security risk for the state, before he was Chinese national. Trade and piracy were closely linked 
according  to  the  bureaucracy.  This  perspective  did  not  help  fight  the  increasing  piracy  in  the 
southern seas. The opposite was true: the piracy networks and organisation became so extensive that 
it was easier to buy a pass of a pirate accomplice at shore or in Macao, to safeguard a passage 
through the area.  As the waters  were patrolled by seven major  pirate  fleets  the chances  to  get 
through  were  almost  nil.  This  extra  payment  drove  the  commercial  viability  of  trade  between 
southern China and Southeast Asia down. Consequently this gave birth to unemployed traders who 
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turned to piracy to survive.69
Not until the pirate fleets got involved in the dynastic troubles in Tonkin and Annam, problems 
arose for these marauders. The Tayson brothers hired pirate fleets to serve as private navies. In the 
following struggles many pirate ships were scuttled. Under pressure of Qing China, the Taysons 
officially relinquished their ties to the pirates and vowed to act against them. Nonetheless not long 
after, the Taysons were defeated and a large portion of the pirate fleets were destroyed. Nevertheless 
this success the piracy presence in the region remained large, slowing down economic progress.70
A second organised  pirate  nest  was  located  in  the  Sulu  archipelago between the  islands  of 
Mindanao and Borneo. The Islamic sultanate reigning there had fought for years for their continued 
independence  of  the  Catholic  Spanish.  When the  Spanish started  to  get  more  interested  in  the 
Philippine islands, pirating activities originating from the sultanate started to increase. Initially the 
Spanish had left the sultanate alone because conquest would waste too many resources for a remote 
outpost of their Empire. Nevertheless, the situation had changed dramatically after the Spanish lost 
their American possessions. The lost prestige and expanding European presence in Southeast Asia 
looking for new territories to annex, made direct control of all the Philippine islands vital to the 
Spanish Crown. To keep up resistance, the Sulu sultanate needed more resources to defend against 
the renewed Spanish efforts. Resources that could be generated with more manpower. As such the 
Sulu sultanate began to be known as one of the more prominent body snatchers, kidnapping crews 
to work on their lands back home.71
For  other  trading  nations  the  pirates  originating  from the  Sulu  sultanate  posed  a  problem. 
Trading vessels could only defend themselves from them in direct combat. As their bases lay in 
areas  the Spanish had claimed sovereignty over,  acting  against  these pirate  ports  proved to  be 
diplomatically impossible for foreign fleets. The pirates had the initiative, an unpleasant position to 
start any battle. By the 1840's however, the Spanish started to smoke out many of the settlements 
from which the pirates operated. This had an immediate effect as persisting pirates had to relocate  
their bases to smaller islands and were temporarily unable to raid. The disruption of the organisation 
of  those  remaining  pirates  proved  to  be  enough  to  lower  the  threat  from these  pirates  to  an 
acceptable level.72
Another hotspot for pirates was the island of Borneo. European activities remained limited to 
certain coastal areas, mainly on the southern shores of the island. Inland territories were mostly 
69 Murray, 'Piracy', p.46, 53-54.
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unknown and the northern and eastern shores were scattered with small clusters of local power such 
as  sultanates,  independent  villages,  chiefdoms  and  Chinese  kongsi societies.  About  this  last 
formations I will go into deeper detail about further in this thesis. The political situation there meant 
that there existed a lot  of unknown small  concentrations of people and potential  places to hide 
piracy on Borneo.73
Besides the lack of exploration and overall knowledge about the area, another problem arose 
fighting piracy in these waters. The pirates operating here were of the 'disorganised' type meaning 
that there was not a core area or fleet to take out but lots of small decentralised cells scattered across 
the shoreline. Most of which were not full-time pirates but rather fishermen or shell divers. Only 
when a ship arrived in their waters they could potentially raid would they throw their tools aside 
and grab their weapons, often killing the crew in the process so that no witnesses of their deeds 
remained.  These  circumstances  made  it  difficult  to  make  the  distinction  between  pirates  and 
fishermen. A Dutch admiral named them “sea people” as they would live of whatever the seas could 
give to them, whether it was in the sea or floating on top of it.74
Operations versus these pirates took a lot of effort and offered few results. Dutch fleets had the 
technological advantage with steam powered ships yet this soon also proved to be a disadvantage. 
The smoke trails left by these ships could be seen from miles away. Ambushes were out of the 
question as the engines needed time to built up pressure during which the suspected pirates had 
been long gone or hidden themselves in one of the many bays. Taking out market places where 
stolen goods were traded only increased piracy as those traders had to look for another way to 
provide for their families. Lack of results let the marine top brass to duly note that their primarily 
duty was being a war fleet and certainly not acting as aqua police for the archipelago. They claimed 
that they were not equipped nor trained for such tasks. Therefore land based operations were made 
the primary method to combat piracy originating from Borneo.75
At the same time a British adventurer called James Brooke had made a deal with the sultan of 
Brunei on the northern coast of Borneo. In return for governorship of the neighbouring Sarawak he 
would crush a rebellion against the sultan. Succeeding in doing so and obtaining his reward, he 
started to act against piracy in his newly gained territories. Brooke's actions and successes were a 
major reason why the British managed to establish a protectorate over northern Borneo.76
A similar type of pirates were active from the eastern shore of Sumatra, especially around the 
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Riau and Lingga island groups. Located at the end of the Strait of Malacca, these islands were the 
ideal base to attack passing merchant ships. Because of their location however, they also quickly 
gained the attention of both Dutch and British colonial governments. Several operations against 
these pirates were conducted yet they had the same problems as the ones against piracy originating 
from Borneo.  Nevertheless  the  pirate  nests  retreated  from the  islands  to  the  eastern  shores  of 
Sumatra. The escape possibilities for pirates there were much more abundant than on the relatively 
small islands of the Riau and Lingga. Eventually piracy declined in favour of smuggling. The area 
was ideally located near the British and Dutch boundary separating their claimed territories and 
even more important near the growing emporium Singapore. Combined with the British open trade 
policy and the Dutch limited trade policy much more profit could be made illegally crossing these 
waters than could be with acts of piracy.77
What we see in the 19th century is a large transformation of the merchant landscape. A transfer of 
trading zones in which Chinese merchants originating from southern China operated. Either to the 
coastal transport to the north of China or resettlement in Southeast Asia in Siam or Singapore.  
Those in the Chinese diaspora that operated from the Nanyang focussed more on the region than the 
traditional connection to China. Bulk goods as rice, salt and sugar were still transported to China 
but the trade in luxury goods was in decline. Piracy was the largest factor contributing to that effect 
but  European  trade  on  Canton  certainly  had  an  accelerating  effect  on  the  transformation.  The 
traditional junk trade from south China was in rapid decline as European competitors sometimes 
literally fought their way in. After two Opium Wars Chinese merchants still operating, inevitably 
had contact with western companies to secure their commercial survival. Secondary trade became a 
major employer for traders still in China.
 Java and Madura
First thing to consider when looking at the Netherlands Indies in the early 19 th century is its size. 
Often when the Dutch possessions are taken into account, the contours of modern Indonesia are 
followed. This approach is partly valid as the Dutch indeed claimed sovereignty over these areas in 
the years after the Napoleonic wars ended. Nonetheless claiming areas is not the same as controlling 
them.  Even in  Holland itself  scholars  had  mainly Java  in  mind when talking  about  the  Dutch 
possessions in Asia. The nearby island of Madura was also considered a stable possession plus the 
handful of scattered trade posts and settlements across the entire Indonesian archipelago.78 
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Not surprising when taken into account that the VOC was a private trading company with little 
to no need for territories. Only after these Asian territories were returned by the United Kingdom 
after Waterloo, a colonial state started to be truly developed. The last remains of indigenous power 
were destroyed during the five years the Java War  lasted until finally in 1830, entire Java was under 
nominal  Dutch  control.  During  the  years  that  followed  the  Dutch  colonial  state  expanded  its 
administration and slowly added more territories  under  her direct  control.  A lasting memory is 
preserved in the name of the category used for these new acquisitions: the outer territories, a term 
still used to make (often pejorative) remarks of the islands further away from Sumatra and Java.79
Even the shipping laws and tariffs, implemented after Dutch repossession, regarded the lack of 
control over much of the territory Dutch sovereignty claimed, as a normal condition. The legal 
system acknowledged that the national boundaries did yet not necessarily mean legal boundaries in 
the archipelago. Tariffs on shipping were only legally applicable in places or areas where there was 
a permanent Dutch presence of some sort. If this was not the case the local indigenous powers could 
decide how much capital the wanted to extract from traders within their harbours.80
As the British had only returned some of the previously Dutch owned territories, there was some 
suspicion towards the motives of the British Empire amongst the Dutch. Her advocacy for a free 
trade policy was acknowledged in Europe but fervently held out of the colonial sphere.  As the 
Dutch colonial  possessions were not as developed in both administrative and economical sense 
compared to the nearby British Indies, free economic access of other European powers including 
the British, was seen as a threat to the colony. Loyalty could easily be swayed in areas were no 
Dutch control was apparent. Secondly the fear existed that letting a competitor on an undeveloped 
market  could  shatter  the  chances  of  own  independent  development.  As  the  validity  of  these 
protective measures is still subject of fiery debate amongst current economists, it will suffice here to 
say that these fears existed, whether their bleak predictions were true or false.81
The choice in policy to separate the market of Netherlands Indies from the world market had 
profound effects.  Two separated markets meant two different systems of tariffs, laws and other 
measures that were supposed to work besides one other. Surprisingly this dual system functioned 
remarkably  well;  it  was  far  from  being  perfect  but  the  output  made  the  effort  worthwhile 
nonetheless. International trade was fixed to one port while all other ports or marketplaces were off 
limits to foreign vessels or merchants. The internal Netherlands Indies market would be provided by 
79 Diehl, F.W. 'Revenue Farming and Colonial Finances in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816-1925', in: John G. 
Butcher & Howard W. Dick (eds.). The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming – Business Elites and the Emergence of  
the Modern State in Southeast Asia, (New York NY, 1993), p.197, Lohanda, Kapitan Cina, p.10
80 Staatkundige Beschouwing Gegrond op de Statistiek van Neêrlands Handel, Nijverheid en Scheepvaart, in  
Neêrlands Indie, in verband tot het vraagstuk der Scheepvaartwetten, ('s Gravenhage, 1850), p.3
81 de Haan Psz, Handelstelsel, p.8-9, 18-23, Staatkundige Beschouwing, p.7-8, 10
36
either local firms or European ones, yet those latter ones were required to enlist Dutch personnel for 
their vessels from 1834 onwards.82
As entry point for international trade Batavia was the central hub within the Dutch possessions. 
From the day of her establishment Jan Pietersz. Coen, the settlement had been planned as a entrepôt 
harbour for the entire region. He had envisioned the Chinese and their trade as central pieces in 
making his plan a success. On this founding thought the city had been built and expanded until it 
was the largest European settlement in the region. The choice to pick this harbour as portal for  
international trade was only natural.83
The Dutch came out of the Napoleonic Wars near a state of bankruptcy. Their homeland ahd 
been controlled by a French puppet king and their colonies were under custody of the British. Most 
of  their  national  income  was  dependent  on  trade  and  during  the  war  period  that  sector  was 
particularly hit hard by the European hostilities. To increase the economic woes, the Belgian Revolt 
and the subsequent secession of the southern provinces of the Netherlands, brought an even heavier 
financial  burden.  The  determination  of  king  William I  to  subdue  Belgium proved  to  be  mere 
stubbornness. As the Dutch army remained in the field for years, the king was forced to admit his 
loss through diplomatic means.84
In the colonies in Asia, the Dutch blamed the interregnum of British statesman Raffles for the 
economic downturn that had hit them. He had been too focussed on reforming Dutch governance to 
British  example  that  he  overlooked  the  consequences  of  economic  stagnation.  The  farms  that 
produced export crops in the colony were in deplorable state, prices of consumer goods were high 
and the possibilities of investors to obtain credit were slim, C.J Elout reported to the Minister of  
Colonies in March 1825.85
In the light of both the domestic Dutch financial woes and the poor economic condition of the 
colonies, a radical new plan of action was deployed that became know as the cultivation system. 
This state organised mode of production would both develop the Netherlands Indies and provide a 
sufficient inflow of capital to the motherland. In short: instead of universal land based taxes, a 
certain amount of the land belonging to local villages had to be used to grow government crops and 
the harvest sold to the Dutch for a predetermined price. Work on these lands would be done by local 
villagers as a form of corvée duty. The Dutch trading corporation (NHM) would transport these 
export  crops  to  Europe  and  sell  them on  markets  located  in  the  Netherlands.  Profits  of  these 
82 Koloniaal Verslag: Verslag van het beheer en den staat der koloniën - 1847-1848 ('s-Gravenhage, 1850), p.13-14
83 Dobbin, Entrepreneurial Minorities, p.47
84 Thee, Kian Wie. 'The Introduction, Evolution, and End of Colonial Extractive Institutions in the Netherlands Indies 
and Its Long-Term Consequences in independent Indonesia', Final revised draft (01-08-2011) of lecture given at  
University of Antwerp okt. 2011, p.2
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transactions would be used to supply a supplementary income for the state budget.86
To make this system function as planned, the trade laws of the Netherlands Indies had to be of a  
protective  nature.  If  foreign  competitors  from Europe  were  allowed  to  ship  produce  that  was 
included in the cultivation system the European market would be spoiled, explains P. de Haan Psz. 
Foreign  competitors  would  supply  their  own  national  markets  instead,  causing  a  decrease  in
re-exports from Holland and decreasing Dutch profits. Because this kind of reasoning was based on 
the European markets, the long history of Chinese trade in the Netherlands Indies and the good 
relationship  with  the  Chinese  community,  incoming  Chinese  junks  had  a  privileged  position 
economically wise compared to other foreign merchants.87
Tariffs of on incoming and outgoing cargoes of international trade were specified according to 
the transporting nation and its destination. For instance Dutch vessels going to the Netherlands paid 
fl.2,- per pikol88 coffee they exported, a foreign vessel would pay fl.4,- for the same amount and a 
foreign vessel going to a foreign harbour would pay fl.5,- per pikol coffee they transported from the 
Netherlands Indies. For other products of the cultivation system such as sugar, spices or tin, tariffs 
of a similar nature existed. For products coming from Europe also a preference was given to Dutch 
production.  Not all  merchandise could come from Dutch sources so there existed trade outside 
government control despite the higher tariffs. Mainly the trade in completed (semi-)products was in 
private hands while the raw resources were transported by government contractors.89
For some export products existed exceptions. For the export of  arak, a rice based liquor, the 
English  vessels  bore  lower  duties  than  other  foreigners.  This  also  was  the  case  for  Chinese 
merchants for most of the products their vessels exported to China. The duties on those exports 
were usually accounted as a percentage of estimated value of the the cargo. For instance exports of 
hides, pelts, tortoises, indigo and sappan wood would pay 2% of the total value. Edible birds nests, 
a delicacy in China, were exported at a higher rate of 6% but that was still less than the rate of 12% 
vessels sailing under different flags had to pay. The positive trade relation with Chinese and the 
ability to offer them something good value for their goods, was worth protecting.90
This approach of the Dutch colonial government is also noticeable from the measures taken to 
safeguard Chinese imports. As wind powered vessels the Chinese junk merchants often stopped at 
multiple harbours before mooring at Batavia. To avoid scaring traders from China away as they 
86 Thee, Colonial Extractive Institutions, p. 2-7
87 de Haan Psz, Handelstelsel, p.31-33
88 About 125 pounds, or 62kg. 
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would have to pay higher import tariffs because they visited these harbours, the decision was made 
to make any harbour between southern China and Java a valid direct trajectory in 1841. It would not 
matter  if  the  Chinese  merchant  visited  either  Manila  or  Singapore  beforehand,  they would  be 
considered coming directly from China tariff wise. This of course had to do with the First Opium 
War that made it difficult for Chinese merchants to return to their homeland whilst the war was still  
being fought. When Hong Kong was ceded to the British at the end of the war the settlement was 
put under the same exception clause as Macao, i.e. it  would be considered as 'China'  in Dutch 
customs.91
Most ship movements to Batavia however,  were those of coastal  shipping. Intra archipelago 
transport and thus intra Netherlands Indies transport, was the primary source of activity in Batavia 
harbour. During this period a stable average of 90% of the annual amount of ships in Batavia sailed 
under the Dutch flag, which included those registered in the Netherlands Indies. About 80% of all 
ship movements in Batavia was made by ships registered in the Netherlands Indies. In terms of last, 
the shipping unit for cargo92, a more detailed picture appears. On average 75% of all cargo was 
handled  by  Dutch  ships  but  only  about  35% was  registered  as  Netherlands  Indies  an  can  be 
considered intra archipelago.93 
This internal Netherlands Indies trade was open to anyone living in the Dutch possessions. A 
majority of  this  trade was done by either  peranakan  Chinese or  Arab merchants settled in  the 
Netherlands Indies. The flag under which ship was sailing was duly noted in the administration as 
belong to the Netherlands Indies but unfortunately these flags do not tell us which ethnic group the 
crew and captain belonged to. The sailing permits granted by the Dutch colonial government, give 
some insight towards that goals but these do not tell us how long these grants stayed in business. 
This lack of reliable information makes it difficult to reconstruct the exact share of local Chinese in 
this  business.  However  the  colonial  government  did  mention  their  concern  about  the  lack  of 
European,  primarily  Dutch,  firms  operating  within  the  archipelago.  Chinese  and  Arab  sailors 
working these trade lanes would handle low minimum cargoes and maintained their vessels poorly, 
doing so pushed European vessels out of the market. To protect these Dutch firms a committee 
advised the government in 1848 to prefer European vessels for government cargoes larger than 75 
lasten.94
We can assume from these measures that  a large number of Chinese were active in coastal 
91 Verslag van den Handel 1841, p.2, Verslag van den Handel 1846, p.1
92 A last would be about two metric tons, although it is known that in earlier VOC times, a last weighted less.
NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043. fol.144
93 See appendix for several graphs showing the changing totals over the years 1825-1873. 
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shipping. However how many of them were recent immigrants remains unclear. Nevertheless it is 
safe to assume that a portion of those crews originated from China as international junk trade was in 
decline. This was also the case for the trade between the Netherlands Indies from southern China. 
During the turn of the century still some 7 junks visited Batavia annually. This number declined 
rapidly during  the mid  19th century.  Table 1 gives  the number  of  vessels  that  sailed under  the 
Chinese flag some 35 years later.95
Table 1: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1833-1837.96
Incoming: Outgoing:
Year Ships Total last Ships Total last
1833 3 200 3 210
1834 2 110 1 80
1835 4 190 4 200
1836 3 290 2 140
1837 3 170 5 345
Besides the traditional products mentioned earlier in this thesis, the Chinese started to import 
large amounts of rice. Southern China had experienced a population boom and those many mouths 
needed to be fed. An increasing amount of rice was exported from Java, a product European traders 
had few uses for. This rice export started to decline as the population growth of Java started to 
accelerate and the rice was needed to feed the local population. This development meant one less 
incentive for Chinese merchants to continue visiting Java.97
Interestingly enough Chinese trade from southern China to Batavia did not seem to falter during 
both Opium Wars. In 1842 Chinese captains stayed a season in Batavia to wait out the war, yet in 
other  years  merchants  continued  to  trade.  It  shows  that  the  war  zone  was  indeed  relatively 
concentrated in the areas around Canton, Shanghai and the southern end of the Grand Canal. The 
Second Opium War however, was more extensive in scale of military actions yet the treaty ports 
were left alone. They could operate during the war although the duties that already were collected 
by western agencies did not flow towards the emperors coffers. European vessels also continued to 
95 Blussé, Leonard. 'The Vicissitudes of Maritime Trade: Letters from the Ocean Hang Merchant, Li Kuhne, to the 
Dutch Authorities in Batavia (1803-1809)', in: Anthony Reid & Kristine Aliluna-Rodgers (eds.). Sojourners and 
Settlers – Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, (St. Leonards, 1996), p.153
96 Uneven incoming and outgoing vessels in this and the following tables, can be explained by passing of the formal 
accounting year before departure. A late departure could be caused by either private choice of forced by necessary 
repairs. Excerpts of the full data are shown in the text, graphs showing the entire development during examined 
period can be found in the appendix.  
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sail towards China during these wars. Ironically the wars had little effect on the volume of trade 
during the time they were fought.98
The years after the First Opium War provides us with some problems interpreting the data. I 
previously mentioned the cession of Hong Kong was incorporated in the Dutch trade tariffs; if a 
ship departed from Hong Kong it would be considered coming from China. However, the flag of 
ships registered there were British, not Chinese. Chinese ships operating under a British flag are 
therefore excluded in the following tables.
Table 2: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1850-1855.99
Incoming: Outgoing:
Year Ships Total last Ships Total last
1850 4 114 3 69
1851 0 0 0 0
1852 1 50 2 70
1853 1 n.a. 1 n.a.
1854 2 88 0 0
1855 6 658 5 763
The sudden increase of activity in 1855 could be explained by the decision of the Dutch colonial  
government to apply the Dutch trading laws also on firms of local Chinese. They had been allowed 
to use their own trading laws incorporated in the Dutch legal codex as a form of common law. An 
inheritance of their prominent position during VOC times. A Mandarin drop-out visiting Java during 
these years mentions the lack of junks in the harbour during these times. The Chinese vessels he 
sees are smaller than he remembers. It is unclear if means all Chinese ships, including those of the 
peranakan, or just those from the Chinese Empire, when he makes this comment. Nonetheless from 
Dutch  sources  a  decrease  in  average  vessel  size  of  ships  that  bore  the  Chinese  flag  is  also 
noticeable.100
The primary reason why Chinese merchants even bothered to continue to visit Batavia lies with 
the Chinese community living there. The peranakan Chinese in Batavia urged the Dutch to improve 
trading conditions on multiple occasions. The local community depended on the Chinese junks to 
keep contact with family, receive information about events in southern China and elsewhere and 
98 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3204, Verslag van den Handel 1839-1842, Koloniaal Verslag 1856-
1860
99 Verslag van den Handel 1850-1852, Koloniaal Verslag 1853-1855
100 Ong, Tae-hae. Chinesche Aanteekeningen omtrent Nederlands-Indië, (’s Gravenhage, 1858), Chen, Chinese 
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41
have access to certain services. One of the specific exports for Chinese junks were the Chinese 
remittances  in  solid  currency.  Remittances  of  locally  settled  Chinese,  whether  permanent  of 
temporary, made up an increasing amount of the total value of goods taken back to China. Much to 
the dismay of the Java Bank in 1845, when the condition came from the Netherlands forbidding 
them momentarily to issue “bank paper” or return the value of paper already issued. These notes 
would be issued for a certain amount of silver or copper by the bank, much like modern paper  
money only with an included fee to the bank, could temporarily not be cashed. Money circulation 
faltered because of the lack of available copper and silver money and by the continued outflow. 
Even worse this meant a loss of confidence in the bank as a reliable institution.101
During  the  1860's  doubts  started  to  emerge  within  the  colonial  administration  about  the 
efficiency of the cultivation system. On the world market prices of the products brought forth by the 
cultivation system started to fall, decreasing the profit margin of the system. Nonetheless it still 
remained profitable for those in power; the colonial Dutch, businessmen in charge of mines and 
local chiefs that received the payments from the Dutch government for the products. However, the 
indications were there that the best days of the system lay in the past. Experiments with private 
investors developing tobacco farms on Java had showed that government led cultivation did not 
necessarily led to better results.102
In turn these conclusions led to questions about the development of the Netherlands Indies as a 
whole under the cultivation system. The duties indigenous people had to perform to benefit either 
the  cultivation  lands  or  local  chiefs,  fixed  them  to  a  specific  spot  and  actually  counteracted 
development because their mobility was removed. Financial exploitation of these people by either 
farm owners  or  businessmen  was  a  too  common  sight  to  deny.  Chinese  peranakan  had  their 
travelling privileges already removed in the past for different reasons concerning security. Allowing 
them to travel and opening of more harbours for foreign trade were steps forward to counter the 
stagnation in the economic development of the colony. The decline of the cultivation system had 
imminent effects on trade as the following table shows.103
101 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Supplement, 1826-1952, nummer toegang 2.10.03, no.31, 
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Table 3: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1866-1871.104
Incoming: Outgoing:
Year Ships Total last Ships Total last
1866 7 521 8 752
1867 8 111 7 57
1868 7 240 8 160
1869 24 453 24 578
1870 35 716 32 571
1871 62 1197 62 1787
The Dutch cultivation system was primarily aimed at the raising revenue for the motherland. As 
it was a colony under royal control this goal could actually be accomplished. Development was a 
part of the initial plans and during the implementation of the system significant achievements in 
production were accomplished. Nevertheless for international trade and in particular Chinese trade, 
it proved to be a disaster. Dutch preference for national entreprise in most arenas of the economy 
prevailed, leaving little space for others. When the supply of export rice in Java diminished, so did 
the incentives for Chinese merchants to visit Batavia. By grace of the Chinese community living in 
Batavia some Chinese traders seem to have persisted trade to the city. Nonetheless, trade between 
Java and southern China by Chinese merchants was barely mentionable during most of the 19th 
century.105
4. Surge of Migration
In the 19th century the foundations were laid out for a period in the early 20th century that later 
would be recalled as the era of great modern migrations. Primarily people think of the massive 
transatlantic flow of migrants from Europe to the Americas concerning this era. That at the other 
side of the globe a migration wave of similar size rolled through the lands, is less well known in the 
western world. The majority of these migrants were former inhabitants of the Chinese Empire. A 
state that was in upheaval since her position in the world was successfully challenged by western 
powers and as a result, the faith in the rule by her imperial court was waning.
Technical innovations redrew the picture of migration both in the Atlantic as in Asia. Steam 
powered  ships  made  regular  long  distance  connections  possible  and  decreased  shipping  prizes 
104  Koloniaal Verslag 1866-1872
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43
immensely. For migrants this seemed to mean less risks when embarking on a journey into the 
unknown. If one was unsuccessful return journeys were available, contact with family members 
remained possible and the journey itself knew less dangers. That reality was often harsher, did not 
slow down the massive increase of long distance migration flows. 
Migration in the east is often associated with coolie labour. The abolition of slave trade rapidly 
increased the demand for free labour in the world. As these jobs were often under poor conditions 
and  badly  paid  it  was  difficult  to  find  people  to  fill  all  positions.  Unaware  individuals  were 
contracted in Asia to solve the labour problems that had risen on the plantation of the west. 
The 'regular'  migration in Asia,  however, was many times larger than this indentured labour 
stream. The rapid development of the world economy and the strategic position of Southeast Asia 
on the major  trade lanes,  made it  a centre  of new developments.  Economic opportunities were 
available  for  both  the  wealthy  and  poor.  For  Chinese  emigrants  it  was  the  ideal  destination: 
relatively close by; Chinese communities already living there; and relatively thinly populated lands 
compared to southern China.
The total Chinese migration flow in the 19th century is difficult to reconstruct. Only after the 
Opium Wars and the administrative takeover in the treaty ports some statistics become available. 
Even of this available data is the historic significance still questioned. According to the imperial 
bureaucracy emigration simply did not happen before the era of treaty ports. People who did not 
return  to  China  after  being  abroad  were  of  no  concern  to  the  Chinese  Emperor  and  frankly 
considered traitors.  Unfortunately,  this  indifference makes  it  hard  to  gain hard  data  concerning 
migration.106
After the treaty ports system was in place passengers were dutifully noted by customs agencies 
in the harbours. Initially only those travelling through Hong Kong in the 1850's, but Amoy and 
some  other  major  migration  ports  followed  about  two  decades  later  in  the  1870's.  The  large 
population streams matured during the turn of the century and peaked once more during the roaring 
twenties of the 20th century. The majority of Chinese migrants went to Southeast Asia and in turn 
the most of them went to the Southeast Asian mainland where the Malay States and Siam were 
located. According to calculations made by Adam McKeown some 6 to 7 million Chinese migrated 
to the Straits Settlement and the Malay States and 3,5 to 4 million to Siam, in the period between 
1840 and 1940.107
Those who travelled to the Nanyang mostly originated from the southern provinces of China. 
106  McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.98, Wang, Chinese Overseas, p.43
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Not surprising considering not only the vicinity, the available infrastructure there and the population 
density of the region. Most arable land already was in use and production methods were advanced 
for a pre-industrial society. Crafts and agriculture had been producing commercially for local or 
international  markets  since  the  18th century.  The  same was  the  case  in  the  silk  business.  The 
population reached such heights that the region became a gross importer of rice, driving up local 
prices.  When  the  local  economy  hit  a  slum  in  the  early  1800's,  problems  quickly  arose  and 
emigration became a viable option for many.108
The  long  trading  tradition  of  the  southern  provinces  provided  migrants  with  a  suitable 
infrastructure over the seas. As merchants went abroad for their trade some remained in Southeast 
Asia for a variety of reasons, some purely economical, others more emotional such as marriage. At 
the beginning of the 19th century these overseas Chinese already had formed tight communities in 
the Nanyang. Families living overseas had family members from China come over  on occasion to 
learn the trade or earn some money for a solid financial basis for marriage. Those who returned to 
China were sojourning in effect, migrating only temporarily for a number of years. This sojourner 
tradition had many benefits for future migrants. Captains and crews often had experience carrying 
at least some passengers and in Southeast Asia the Chinese community living there could teach the 
immigrant what he needed to know about his new life. It was not uncommon this meant learning the 
Malay language  proficiently, to be useful in the trading business.109
The indifference of the Chinese emperor towards overseas 'subjects', or rather overseas Chinese, 
did not mean a lack of legislation in China. Au contraire, the Qing dynasty held a close eye on the 
coastal provinces and the population living there as they were to be considered a major security 
risk.  Legislation  concerning  international  travel  or  trade  was  strict,  although  in  practice  some 
creative interpretations of the legislation probably were in effect to smoothen operations concerning 
trade in the harbours. Officially a merchant had gotten permission to stay outside Qing territory for 
a period of three years before he was banned from re-entry. This period was already longer than was 
the case during the 18th century,  when the duration was only one years and this  extension was 
granted after pressure from southern provincial governors.110
One peculiar law that affected Chinese migration was the prohibition of female migration. Many 
cultures had superstitions about women on board of seafaring ships yet seldom such beliefs are 
codified in law. This of course was not the case in China either. By forbidding women to migrate 
some control over on their seagoing male counterparts was achieved. A married man would less 
108 Rawski, Evelyn S. Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China, (Cambridge MA, 1972)
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likely leave his  entire  family behind to  settle  elsewhere.  The law therefore both contained the 
population  within  the  empire,  as  that  it  cut  connections  for  those  who  settled  elsewhere.  The 
Chinese men stuck overseas would either marry someone indigenous where they settled and would 
therefore likely have less interest in China's affairs, or they would 'die out' after a generation failing 
to reproduce. In either way, they would be less likely to pose a sustained threat to China.111
In the early 19th century this law still functioned properly. In 1833 Dutch sources quoted Count 
of Hogendorps work once again,  who mentioned about the Chinese travelling or trading in the 
Nanyang the following: “Never is there a woman amongst them”. Officially this female migration 
prohibition would not be revoked by the Qing until 1893. However, after the Opiumwars, imperial 
control had declined substantially. When the number of emigrants from China swell over 100.000 
persons a year during the 1870's it became possible to sneak women out. Female emigration was 
still illegal yet it became downright impossible for the Qing administration to uphold the law. It is 
safe to say by then legislation followed common practice.112
The cession of Hong Kong and opening of treaty ports in China to western influence made sure 
that China had little to no control over her international trade. However to an extent the same could 
be said about her political borders. Many of the migrants that left China during the latter part of the 
19th century went through treaty ports or one of the close by western cities such as Hong Kong and 
Macao. As those settlements were not bound by Chinese law, the first specialised companies, both 
western and Chinese, had a least a branch office located in one of these cities. Hong Kong remained 
large passenger  node throughout  the 19th century but  the stream of  migrants travelling through 
Macao diminished rather fast. The port soon began to gain a bad name amongst Chinese because of 
the bad conditions her emigrants had to bear.  Many of the migrants that ended up as the slave 
replacements in the Americas travelled through Macao. As such the conditions of the journey and 
the labour at destination, were often dreadful.113
Nonetheless these negative stories did not discourage Chinese migrants to keep coming to the 
shoreline  to  try  their  luck  overseas.  Many of  them had  kin  abroad  and  knew  that  not  in  all 
destinations conditions were as dire as on the plantations and mines. By then not only economic 
motives drove the Chinese out of the homes but also disorder in society. The trust in the Mandate of 
Heaven of the Qing dynasty had been given an awful blow by the loss of the Opiumwars, and 
therefore the legitimacy of Qing's rule was questioned. Those defeats triggered a string of rebellions 
and revolts wreaking havoc in the Chinese Empire.114
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The Taiping Rebellion was the largest and most well known of those rebellions. Between 1850 
and 1864 armies of the rebels clashed repeatedly with the divisions put forth by the Qing dynasty.  
After the loss of the First Opium War, the poor conditions of living in the inland provinces and a 
general anti-Qing sentiment sprouted a revolt. Lead by a converted Chinese that claimed to be the 
younger  brother  of  Christ,  the rebellion  called  for  broad social  reforms that  would replace  the 
current hegemony of Confucianism, Buddhism and local religions. As the revolt spread the rebels 
established a new kingdom with the old city of Nanking as their capital. The prolonged hostilities 
destabilized  much of  the  central  areas  in  China  and were  devastating  for  her  economy.  Many 
harvests were lost which led to famine and disease spreadind rapidly through the lands. By 1864 
imperial forces with the help of western officers, had conquered much of the rebel territories and 
finally captured Nanking. The remaining soldiers of the Taiping rebels continued to fight for the 
following years but the zenith of their power had passed after they lost their leaders in Nanking. 
Some 20 million people are estimated to have died in the clashes or as direct consequences of the 
devastation brought forth by the rebellion.115
Still,  this was not the only insurrection in China. On the northern planes the Nien rebellion 
erupted roughly at the same time as the Taiping revolt, and lasted from 1851 to 1864. Recurring 
floods of the Yellow River and the lack of proficient countermeasures and aid for the struck regions 
from the Qing administration, made the local population and soldiers stationed in the regions, lose 
all fate in the Qing leadership. With their attacks the Nien rebels cut off the supply line between 
Beijing and the region where the Taiping rebellion raged, thus damaging vital support lines for Qing 
forces there. Because of the great amount of cavalrymen amongst Nien forces, they could strike fast 
and cover a large area.  The Qing forces already thinly spread because of the efforts  versus de 
Taiping armies had great difficulties pinning down the Nien rebels. This resulted in widespread 
damage and a decline of  necessary tax income for the Qing government to cope with these threats. 
Nien forces attacked the sources of financial power of the Qing thus trying to deplete their coffers 
and consequently stop their possibilities to send out military campaigns. Nonetheless when Qing 
forces successfully decapitated the Taiping rebellion of their high command, the attention of the 
Qing shifted towards getting the same result by killing the Nien leadership. It was deemed the best 
method to counter the threat of the fast cavalry units of the Nien. However,  when Qing forces 
succeeded in their plans the Nien armies remained organised unlike the Taiping rebels. Ultimately 
when  one  of  of  their  major  armies  was  defeated  near  Beijing  with  the  use  of  western  guns, 
resistance was finally broken. Remaining Nien sympathisers were pushed back and systematically 
115  Schoppa, R. Keith. The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History, (New York, 2000), p.22-26
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annihilated.116
Besides these two major destabilising revolts several smaller Muslim rebellions in the western 
territories of the Chinese Empire and one in the remote province of Yunnan tore through the land. It 
is no exaggeration to state that territories of the Qing were in chaos, as civil war was waged for  
supreme power in the empire. Apart from the destruction brought upon China by the armed conflict 
it also brought her internal economy down. The Qing had lost the possibility to create their own 
foreign economic policy, had no rights to act against western citizens that broke Chinese law and 
lost much of their tax base as consequence of the internal conflicts. China's inhabitants had to bear 
with  a  severely  shaken  economy,  famine,  disease  and  a  situation  of  complete  disorder  in  the 
majority of areas.117
It comes as no surprise that those who had the possibilities leave took almost any chance for a 
better  life.  Labour  recruiters  for  enterprises  abroad  had  few  difficulties  to  find  new  workers. 
Whether the recruiters were honest about the jobs they offered or promised ones with unrealistic 
prospects,  people  were  prone  to  believe  whatever  'chance'  was  presented  to  them.  In  these 
conditions the first  labour  agencies started along the coastline.  It  is  no wonder that there were 
organisations with a less noble working ethos amongst those.118 
Hong  Kong  and  Macao  were  the  larger  migration  nodes  on  the  Chinese  coast  but  a  new 
settlement in Southeast Asia turned out to be the central migration node for that region. Singapore 
quickly became central  pivot  of migration in  the Nanyang.  About  half  of  all  Chinese migrants 
travelling to a destination in Southeast Asia, first went through this port city. Besides the structural 
advantages an entrepôt offered, the port also could function as an intermediate for destinations that 
had gotten a bad name amongst Chinese migrants because of the poor working conditions, such as 
the tin mines on the island of Banka.119 
The city of Singapore had rapidly grown from 1819 onward to become the commercial centre of 
the region. Entrepreneurs with a Chinese background flocked from stagnant cities such as Malacca 
to make use of the advantages of the free trade doctrine Singapore had to offer. This movement 
made for a city that was distinctly different from her surrounding area, as it became and stayed a 
predominantly Chinese city. An environment that was attractive for Chinese migrants as they did 
not disembark into an entirely strange society on arrival. These merchants bridgeheads as Philip 
Kuhn dubs them were made possible by the quickly developing trade around Singapore.120
We can also see here that the direct links from labour destinations in the Southeast Asia to the 
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southern Chinese coast  were diminishing in favour  of the divided trading zone as displayed in 
figure 3 (on page 26). Passengers were transported to Singapore before they went on their second 
journey to the actual sites were their services were needed. Singapore had a pivotal role in all major 
marine endeavours in region, whether it was trade or the labour market and the passengers transport 
that came with it.
In the second chapter I considered the scale of free and non-free labour that existed in Southeast 
Asia.  The distinction  between those  categories  was  not  that  clear  as  one  might  believe.  Many 
migrants to Southeast Asia were indentured labourers as they had gone into debt to finance their 
journey. One particular feature of these debts I want to emphasise once again is the transferability of 
these debts. This meant that in Southeast Asia a flexible labour market could exist as the labourers 
were  not  necessarily  tied  to  one  employer.  Within  the  Chinese  diaspora  apparently  existed  a 
framework of multiple organisations with a sufficient level of trust between them to exchange large 
debts. The initial capital for the journey of one labourer had to be invested by other organisations 
than the actual employer, he only took on the debt when the labourer arrived and started working 
for him. The exchange of capital involved in these debts accumulated to massive figures. Still, the 
individual debt taken on by the migrant was small enough that it became impossible for him to both 
pay off his debt and gain some personal profit. Given the intrinsic nature of these networks, a closer 
look at the sort of Chinese organisations functioning in Southeast Asia, concerning the multiple 
facets of migrant labour, will be useful.121
Chinese organisational  form has  been subject  to  much debate.  It  has  been surrounded by a 
shroud of mystery as western colonial governments had trouble understanding and penetrating these 
organisational structures. They tried to fit Chinese organisations into a modern western model in 
which many peculiar Chinese details were lost. Because of this troubled perception changes within 
Chinese  organisations  and  actions  made by them were  often  not  completely observed or  fully 
understood.  And, especially by the more shady businesses,  there was made use the absence of 
accurate knowledge amongst colonial governments to increase profits, adding only more confusion. 
As such it is difficult to reconstruct these organisations and how they operated in the Nanyang.122
Scholars  have  looked at  organisational  forms  used in  China  to  provide  a  backbone of  how 
Chinese organisations in Southeast Asia might have been set up. As Chinese companies, especially 
those operating in the overseas labour business soon adapted to function in relation to western 
companies in the treaty ports, this approach does not immediately give a clear answer. Both the 
cooperation with westerners and the change in environment, Southeast Asia instead of China, gave 
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rise to a number of deviations. Yet by reconstructing original Chinese organisational formats, one 
can  assume  that  some  characteristics  of  those  formats  must  have  been  reproduced  in  the 
organisational structures of Chinese firms operating in the Nanyang.123
Philip Kuhn has formulated a categorisation of how Chinese formed groups, associations and 
other sorts of organisations. In his book he emphasizes the trust or bond that had to exist between 
people  to  form  a  functioning  organisation.  By  examining  how  this  'bonding'  was  reproduced 
elsewhere outside China, we can understand how these groups functioned in daily life. According to 
Kuhn this mutual trust could be either based on real similarities or notional resemblances. The latter 
was primarily used abroad as bonding mechanism, while the former was more commonly used if 
there were any common grounds available to the migrants. Imagined similarities could be either 
based on experiences in China or completely reinvented in Southeast Asia to form groups.124
First of all Kuhn formautes a category for organisations that were based on a common origin. 
Shared native place bonds gave overseas Chinese a common background and often dialect. From 
such similarities trust could form in an otherwise foreign environment. In the second category a 
shared religious experience was a central  theme.  As Chinese folk religions had many different 
deities often blessing certain businesses, much like Catholic Saints, a common ground could be 
found when Chinese abroad visited the same temple or shrines. As these deities blessed specific 
(economic) endeavours these people usually had some similarities in work activities, which in turn 
could help to form larger organisations or networks between those individuals.125
The following categories that Kuhn describes were often more based on newly formed relations 
than a mutual background of the migrant took originating from China. Seemingly contradictory to 
the last sentence, one of these new groupings were surname associations. Identical surnames might 
suggest some family connection but often these surnames were created overseas to reproduce a 
familial network as was common in China. Of course some real family ties did exist and sometimes 
even real family ties came forth from relations made in these imagined surname associations, but 
seldom entire families emigrated from China during most of the 19th century. What often did happen 
was  that  second or  third  degree  family members  arrived  later  treading  the  same path  as  their  
predecessor and were introduced to these associations.126
The last  category Kuhn elaborates on are the brotherhoods.  Instead of the traditional  multi- 
generational hierarchy these associations were commonly organised along one generation. Some of 
these, predominantly the criminal ones, went as far as sharing blood to form a bond. Persons in 
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these organisations would be organised along merits valuable to the group. To invoke a form of 
familial  hierarchy,  higher  respected  individuals  were  addressed  as  “older  brother”  and  the  less 
important  as  “younger  brother”.  The  Chinese  associations  that  were  addressed  by the  colonial 
governments as “secret societies” often knew this type or organisation.127
Kuhn  also  places  many  of  the  kongsis under  this  category  because  of  they  lacked  other 
similarities between their group members. Often organisations that worked in what he designates as 
“frontier regions”, the groups had need for a bond that superseded normal trust in one other. For 
instance the independent  Chinese tin  mines  that  were located on Borneo were organised along 
kongsi lines. They tended to have characteristics of a commune as these groups of men worked the 
mines for economic profit, lived together as a group, had rules or laws amongst them and usually 
held some diplomatic relations with local chiefs.  On Borneo these  kongsis  even went as far as 
having armed conflicts with other kongsis to settle disputes.128
In essence however, a kongsi was an organisation between Chinese men that decided to work for 
a common goal.129 Often these goals were purely economic where participants provided capital, 
effort  and their  own labour to seek profit  that would be impossible to reach when working on 
individual basis. This was how the kongsis usually were interpreted by the colonial governments; as 
a commercial organisation. However as we have seen these organisations could strive for goals 
other than purely economic profit, for instance political changes. Not seldom powerful businessmen 
had ties to these groups -although hidden from the public eye- to strengthen their own interests in 
exchange for investments.130
The unsystematic organisational structure posed problem in the long run. As kongsis  outlasted 
many  personal  endeavours  responsibilities  within  the  organisation  became  unclear.  The 
consequences of choices  made in  the  kongsi  were carried by those who did the labour  but the 
participants who made that choices were only nominally involved. Earlier the distinction has been 
made between laukehs and sinkehs, experienced versus new labourers. On occasion a kongsi grew 
to a situation where the original participating labourers (laukehs) simply hired others (sinkehs) to 
fulfil  their  obligation  in  the  kongsi.  As personal  ties  became thin  so  did  the  check on ethical 
behaviour. If these kongsis started producing for other private companies or in a construction as the 
cultivation  system  in  Netherlands  Indies,  responsibilities  became  even  more  stretched.  In  the 
cultivation system government officials would only held accountable if output was low and private 
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entrepreneurs only cared for a low price, an ideal recipe for unethical conditions. If the areas were 
the kongsis operated lay outside direct state control excesses could became policy. I would like to 
stress  that  this  is  by no  means  an  excuse  for  these  developments,  only an  explanation  of  the 
conditions in which such degeneration could occur.131
Singapore as central migrant node for Southeast Asia supplied many of the new labourers. As the 
business of migrant transportion began to massively increase in size it started to transform from the 
1850's  onward.  In  the  business  more  shady  companies  started  to  operate  that  moved  Chinese 
migrants under substandard conditions. Some of the Chinese brotherhoods that did help built up and 
retain control over Singapore and the Straits Settlement for the British colonial government, were 
involved with these exploitation rings. From 1869 onward the British cracked down on the worst 
abuses in the coolie trade within their borders. By 1877 a Chinese protection clause was announced 
by government that  prohibited misdeeds against Chinese immigrants. By 1889 the British colonial 
government went as far as prohibiting all Chinese brotherhoods and secret societies all together. A 
crude measure that showed the difficulties European colonials had with incorporating and dealing 
with Chinese organisations within her territories.132
Java and Madura
The Chinese presence and connections to Java dated back to the centuries long before the Dutch 
arrived.  Nonetheless  the  settlement  of  the  Dutch  on  Java  in  1619  gave  a  new  impetus  for 
development and led to permanent settlement of a Chinese community in Batavia. As the Dutch did 
not fully trust the local Javanese and considered the Chinese further developed as a culture, they 
were welcomed within the VOC walls. Batavia grew out to be a settlement were most of the small  
trade, crafts and manual labour were done by Chinese while being governed by a rather small Dutch 
elite.133
As the VOC was  initially a relatively small player in Asia much of the intermediate trade was 
outsourced  to  non-European  merchants.  This  marine  trade  over  longer  distances  was  done  by 
certain specialised trading peoples non-indigenous to Java.  Therefore a distinction was made in 
Batavian  society  between  an  indigenous  group  of  Asians  and  a  separate  group  that  was  not 
originally from Java, usually designated in English as Foreign Asiatics. Chinese settlers belonged to 
this group, as did their offspring, but also Arab, Japanese or Gujarati individuals were included in 
this category.134
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The Chinese minority however,  had a  special  position in  Batavian society.  Because of  their 
economic importance to the settlement and their prominence as a community, the Chinese were 
granted quite some legal autonomy as long as Dutch supremacy was adhered. A typical method of 
governing trading settlements during those days. This autonomy grew out to be  to a full fledged 
administrative  unit  independently  functioning  besides  the  VOC administration  of  Batavia.  The 
individuals  holding prominent  positions  within  this  framework,  the  “captain”  and “lieutenants” 
China, were chosen by the Dutch after a selection done by the Chinese Counsel of Batavia.135
With the demise of the VOC and the integration of their Asian possessions into the Kingdom of 
the  Netherlands,  this  pluralistic  system became under  scrutiny.  Initially,  when  the  Netherlands 
Indies were under direct royal control, just the Chinese influence in governmental matters declined. 
From 1848 onwards, as the Dutch strived for a uniform state system throughout their territories, this 
pluralist system of sovereignty did not fit the time any more. The remaining legal powers were 
stripped off the captains and lieutenants as their tasks shrank to being an advice committee for the 
colonial  government,  settling   Chinese  family  matters  and  maintaining  the  Chinese  religious 
grounds.136
Not only for Chinese inhabitants of the Netherlands Indies circumstances changed. After the 
British interregnum during the Napoleonic Wars the islands were given back to the Netherlands, 
which was now a kingdom instead of a republic. New policies were being developed for the colony 
as result of this political change. Policies such as the cultivation system as an economic accelerator 
but also the method of how the colony was run. Especially after the Java War of 1825 to 1830, in  
the Netherlands emerged the wish to have more influence on the daily governance of the colony. 
The war had seriously damaged the trust people in Holland had in the capabilities of the residents of 
the  Netherlands  Indies.  While  since  1825  a  preference  was  given  to  Dutch  born  government 
personnel in the Indies, this was never formally codified. To achieve permanent influence in 1842 a 
law was passed that made it necessary to obtain a degree from Royal Academy in Delft to fit the 
requirements  for  the  higher  positions  in  the  colonial  government.  In  effect  this  meant  that  the 
majority of the colonial government became Dutchmen straight from the motherland, as few in the 
colony could pay for the journey to Delft in Holland and back.137
By 1848 a wave of revolutions swept through Europe and the Netherlands were not spared from 
the consequences. Thorbecke drafted a constitution which cuffed the majority of power of King 
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William II in favour of an elected parliament. This changed the Netherlands Indies from a colony in 
hands of the king, to a colonial state under scrutiny of the Dutch parliament.  From then on an 
annual  colonial  report  was  written  of  the  developments  in  the  Dutch  colonies  for  approval  of 
parliament and in a slow process, regulation was made uniform throughout all territories.138
In the Netherlands Indies the political developments in Holland were welcomed and taken as an 
opportunity to  regain  more  control  over  government  policy in  the  colonies.  They felt  that  the 
development of the Netherlands Indies was halted and that they were treated as second rate citizens. 
The lack of influence in the highest echelons of the colonial government was hated by colonial 
Dutch,  Chinese  and Javanese  alike.  Educational  facilities  in  the  colony were  considered  to  be 
severely lacking to offer a proper upbringing and the prohibition of independent pamphlets and 
journals in the colony was considered insulting by its inhabitants.139
Nonetheless the process of governmental adjustments was slow. As mentioned earlier trade laws 
were made applicable to everyone in 1855, including the  peranakan Chinese. In addition became 
slave ownership  forbidden in the Netherlands Indies in that year. The “Delftse rule”, as the Dutch 
academic requirement for higher colonial positions was known, took longer to be revoked. Until 
1864 this condition remained firmly in place as it was an effective method for Holland to keep tight 
control over the colony. By then however, Jean Gelman Taylor ascertains, the colonial society of 
Java  was  transformed  from a  cosmopolitan  to  an  ethnically  separated  society.  Years  of  Dutch 
immigration had made for a distinct and distant Dutch elite.140
The Dutch parliament also had problems gaining influence in colonial governance. King William 
III and the cabinet tried to keep parliamentary influence in the colony to a minimum. As the king 
still had the right to appoint the governor-general of the Netherlands Indies and the leading policies 
came from the cabinet their combined influence was still high. Only by the years 1866-1867 with 
cases  Mijers  and Luxembourg,  parliament  refused to  approve the annual  budget  of  the cabinet 
rendering them powerless, their resistance was broken and parliament could reign supreme.141
It is interesting to note that after the requirement for an education at the Royal  Academy in Delft 
was dropped and parliament gained more control, the cultivation system soon came under scrutiny. 
The novel  Max Havelaar  that  showed the general public  the excesses that  happened under the 
system, is, of course, partially responsible for this renewed attention. Yet in the years after these 
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institutional  changes the deconstruction of the cultivation system went on at  a  astounding rate. 
Nevertheless, the position of the indentured labourer did not change much as that was considered 
primarily a  private  agreement  between employer  and employee.  The very nature of  indentured 
labour put the participating labourers in a vulnerable position.142 
Did  the  position  of  individual  labourers  in  the  Netherlands  Indies  not  have  top  priority  in 
government policy, security and safety of the colony did. Groups in society were strictly divided 
along  ethnic  and  cultural  lines  in  government  policy and  were  closely  monitored  for  signs  of 
trouble. Especially size and unrest within these groups was considered dangerous. During the year 
1740 unrest and lack of supervision had lead to scuffles between Dutch and Chinese citizens in the 
surrounding area of Batavia. Eventually those incidents escalated in an all-out battle during which, 
Chinese citizens that had nothing to do with the unrest, fell victim to a pogrom within city walls.  
The repercussions  of that  tragic  day were still  noticeable in  the policies  of the Dutch colonial 
government of more than half a century later.143
As security measures there was a district system functioning where Chinese within the Dutch 
territory had to live together in a separate quarter and a pass system was in place limiting their free 
travel. The peranakan Chinese on Java had to first present a request to the colonial administration 
with the reason of the journey and estimated travel period, before a pass could be given allowing the 
recipient to travel through several Dutch administrative territories. While the district system was not 
tightly supervised because of the familiarity with the people involved, the pass system remained 
functioning strictly to the letter.144
In 1802 a law was passed limiting immigration of Chinese to the Netherlands Indies. In the city 
of  Batavia  the  number  of  arrivals  per  incoming  junk  was  limited  at  the  same  time.  Making 
immigration laws more stringent meant a reverse of the ongoing trend of relaxation of measures 
towards Chinese. Nonetheless redirecting Chinese marine traffic to Batavia was later re-enforced 
when the cultivation system on the Netherlands Indies was implemented.145
The next obstacle for the Chinese passenger business appears during the Java War between 1825 
and  1830.  In  the  remote  rural  areas  involvement  of  the  Chinese  minority  in  the  conflict  was 
suspected. By 1827 a complete ban on immigration was put into place. The effects that this ban had  
142 Ergo, it solely removed government as participating and therefore responsible actor. Excesses created by private 
greed and/or low market prices for products, were not prevented as these were the results of proper market 
functions according to contemporary economists.
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on trade are  difficult  to  reconstruct.  The Dutch administration in  these days  put  incoming and 
outgoing Chinese ships together with Siamese ships in the statistics. It is unclear why this happened 
but one could argue that the since the new king of Siam was of Chinese decent, the Dutch thought 
of them as part of the Chinese diaspora. Another possible explanation draws back to the governor 
mentioning that the Chinese were highly numerous in Siam, something that was also stated by 
Jennifer Cushman in her research concerning the junk trade to Siam. However, during the short 
years the immigration ban was functioning, the distinction suddenly was made between Chinese and 
Siamese  ships.  A clear  picture  showing  the  consequences  of  the  ban  that  lasted  until  1830 
unfortunately cannot  be  given  as  Siamese  trade  with  Batavia  during  those  years  also  strongly 
fluctuated.146
Table 4: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1827-1831.147
Incoming: Outgoing:
Year Ships Total last Ships Total last
1827 20* 1062* 8* 722*
1828 8 805 8 805
1829 8 582 5 587
1830 4 315 7* 495*
1831 9* 500* 9* 500*
The  values  with  asterisks  include  Siamese  vessels.  The  years  the  immigration  ban  was  in  place  are  
highlighted with grey. N.B. as the scale of the table is annual, some spillover during the mentioned starting  
and ending years of the implemented measure should be taken into account.
From 1830 onwards Chinese immigration to the Netherlands Indies was once again possible. 
Nevertheless,  a  measure  that  limited  Chinese  arrivals  to  200  per  incoming  junk  was  put  into 
function. The maximum served both to improve conditions on the transporting ships, as limit the 
total of immigration without similar rises in trade. By 1833 immigration was once again shortly 
forbidden.  In  the  trade  statistics  collected  by the  Dutch,  it  is  interesting  to  see that  from then 
onwards the Chinese and Siamese vessels remain divided as separate nations in the data. There is no 
convincing proof that suggests these two phenomena are connected as the cultivation system was 
implemented  in  the  years  thereafter,  yet  this  sudden  division  is  remarkable.  Even  more  when 
considered that trade by Chinese vessels to and from Batavia between 1833 and 1836 shrank to an 
annual average of three junks in and out. However some relation between immigration measures 
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and the frequency of Chinese junks seems to appear, how slim this relation may be.148  
Table 5: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1833-1836.149
Incoming: Outgoing:
Year Ships Total last Ships Total last
1833 3 200 3 210
1834 2 110 1 80
1835 4 190 4 200
1836 3 290 2 140
The years during the immigration ban are highlighted in grey. 
In  1837  immigration  of  Chinese  individuals  was  once  again  forbidden  by  the  colonial 
government.  However  this  measure  was  almost  immediately  revoked  in  1838.  A shortage  of 
craftsmen in Batavia was put forth as reason. The dependency of Batavia on the Chinese, whether  
peranakan or their newly arrived assistants, as a providing middle-class for the Netherlands Indies 
made rigorous immigration policies impractical. Unfortunately data concerning the year 1838 seems 
to be lost for and therefore a comparison with the previous year is impossible.150
 That brings us to an important yet uncertain variable in this quotation. It remains unknown how 
fast information of these immigration measures travelled throughout the region and to China. We 
can assume that the rate of information transfer would not be the same in every occurrence. After 
some years however, we can surmise that the unclear situation in Batavia made merchants with 
passengers on board, more cautious to sail to Batavia. It is known that western merchants often 
envied the fast Chinese information networks on trading prices in the region. It is not strange to 
speculate that the information that spread through the Chinese communities in the diaspora may 
also  included  particular  government  policies  that  may  affected  trade.  The  Chinese  community 
residing in Batavia could send out word in advance of the changed immigration environment. This 
community also lobbied at the colonial government to lighten the measures at times. The earlier 
mentioned debt construction where the Chinese community in Batavia paid for the transport of the 
incoming migrants, shows that there existed a relation between new arrivals, transporters and the 
peranakan in Batavia. The exact details of how these connections were established and maintained 
in the Chinese diaspora, unfortunately lie in the realm of speculation.151
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151  Furata, 'Shanghai Trading Network', p.25, Chen, Chinese Gemeenschap, p.1
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The annulment in 1838 of the immigration ban did not mean that the renewed immigration was 
not subject to strict rules. Therefore it was requested by the Chinese Counsel in Batavia to ease 
immigration  laws  and  return  to  the  1830  model  where  junks  could  carry  a  maximum of  200 
passengers for Batavia. The poor economic situation in China was a reason for many of the Chinese 
community to bring struggling family members to Batavia. The Dutch colonial government agreed 
and in 1845 no less than 923 immigrants arrived. Further relaxation of the immigrations measures 
was requested as there were shortages on Chinese personnel in higher educated jobs in fields such 
as accountancy, teaching and Chinese medicine. How effective these pleas towards that goal were is 
not visible in new legislation but by 1846 at  least craftsmen were once again exempt from the  
immigration quota's.152 
Table 6: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1844-1847.153
Incoming: Outgoing:
Year Ships Total last Ships Total last
1844 12 608 2 140
1845 2 86 2 86
1846 2 109 3 149
1847 4 99,5 15 434,5
It is interesting to see is that the Chinese Counsel in Batavia used a economic argumentation in 
their plea to relax immigration laws. The column that gives the combined sizes of cargo of the 
Chinese vessels clearly show that the economic downturn in China was persisting in this period. 
That Chinese captains waited for a prolonged time in harbour as this table suggests, is remarkable 
and might be related to the unclear situation in China after the First Opium War. That the Batavian  
Chinese Counsel relates passenger transport directly to economic opportunities is clear when they 
calculate that if a junk captain hypothetically would ask 3 or 4 pieces silver for the journey to  
Batavia and carried 200 passengers, that he would break even towards his expenses for his trip. If 
Chinese junks could get the expenses of the fare covered through passenger transport, they surely 
would be more inclined to bring their trade to the port of Batavia.154
Additionally  the  Chinese  Counsel  warned against  making legal  immigration  to  hard.  Illegal 
immigration was fairly easy to organise in such a large archipelago and would definitely rise if the 
legal immigration became near to impossible. The strict policies would drive future migrants into 
152  Sandick, Chineezen buiten China, p.181, Chen, Chinese Gemeenschap, p.121
153  Verslag van den Handel 1844-1847 
154  Chen, Chinese Gemeenschap, p.121
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choosing  the  illegal  alternative  as  that  option  would  give  them a  bigger  chance  to  enter  the 
Netherlands Indies than entering legally. Especially since the migrants took on a large debt for the 
journey they would choose the option with the largest chance to success.155
In 1848 constitutional developments in the Netherlands triggered an hesitant response in the 
colonial government as they awaited the changes that would occur. The economic future of China 
was still bleak and so junk trade faltered. By 1851 the immigration measures that made it easier for 
Chinese craftsmen to enter the Netherlands Indies were revoked, dropping the number of Chinese 
vessels  in  Batavia  even  further.  As  few  ships  came  and  immigration  criteria  were  strict  the 
sojourning practice of Chinese families overseas became difficult to uphold. Sending apprentices 
from China to Batavia to learn a particular trade in a safe environment after which, when they 
mastered the necessary skills, would return to China became nearly impossible.156 To stimulate the 
waning junk trade the Dutch colonial government, on initiation of the Chinese Counsel, invoked a 
new temporary measure in 1853. They would let Chinese traders stay a period of six months to do 
their business as long as the Counsel would take responsibility for them actually leaving after this 
period. In 1855 the exceptional legal position of the Chinese within the colony was finally scrapped 
due to the reforms. Only the Chinese marriages and inheritance matters were allowed to be dealt  
with  autonomously.  From  then  on  trade  and  crafts  of  the  Chinese  minority  would  be  held 
accountable to the same legal code as everyone else.157
In the 1860's significant changes followed each other rapidly. In 1864 the colonial government 
send a conceptual measure to Holland requesting a relaxation of the pass system that limited travel 
in the Netherlands Indies for the Chinese and other Foreign Asiatics. By 1866 an approval came 
from Holland to implement these new guidelines although in some areas the local governments 
already  allowed  some  travel.  In  1869  the  protective  measures  of  the  cultivation  system were 
abandoned, coincidentally the same year the Suez Canal was opened in Egypt. And by 1870 the 
immigration and investment restrictions that were imposed on European, and Dutch, citizens and 
businesses were lifted. At the same time the annual emigration of  labourers out of China breached 
the 100.000 mark. The effects these developments had on trade in the closed off economy of the 
Netherlands Indies are evident, as the following table shows.158
155  Chen, Chinese Gemeenschap, p.123
156 It is interesting to note that this practise had reversed trajectory compared to earlier times when overseas Chinese 
send their sons back to China to master their craft or trade. 
Chen, Chinese Gemeenschap, p.109
157  Chen, Chinese Gemeenschap, p.123-125, van der Valk, 'Rechtspositie', p.28
158 NL-HaNA, Koloniën suppl., 2.10.03, no.24, fol.590-592, Thee, Colonial Extractive Institutions, p.7, Taylor, Social  
World, p.128, McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.99, Sugihara, 'Patterns', p.244
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Table 7: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1866-1871.159
Incoming: Outgoing:
Year Ships Total last Ships Total last
1866 7 521 8 752
1867 8 111 7 57
1868 7 240 8 160
1869 24 453 24 578
1870 35 716 32 571
1871 62 1197 62 1787
Years highlighted dark grey, signify a relaxation of the pass system; years highlighted light grey signify the  
abandonment of the cultivation system 
One of the primary elements worth noticing is the vibrant and often ambiguous relation between 
the Dutch colonial government and the Chinese minority on Java. Sometimes the hard working 
attitude of the peranakan Chinese was praised and at other times their underhanded practices were 
cursed, often even by the same person. This schism in perspective of of government officials on the 
Chinese minority trickled down in the policies concerning immigration. Policy makers wanted to 
see the Chinese as one homogeneous group while experiences showed time and time again that this  
was not the case. Notwithstanding all these different opinions concerning the Chinese, the Dutch 
waited until 1858 to send out students to China to master the Chinese language fluently instead of  
being entirely dependent on freelance translators.160
Especially the relationship between indigenous people and the Chinese was often interpreted as 
problematic by the colonial government. As early as 1833 reports mention that the Chinese were 
indeed effective in commerce but by their success, left little room for the indigenous people to 
develop. An argument that was repeated in the report  of F. Fokkens examining the situation of 
Foreign Asiatics on Java in 1894. However some distinctions between Chinese were made during 
latter part of the 19th century. The peranakan Chinese were now called loyal subjects yet the new 
temporary arrivals were blamed for their total disregard for local society. Especially Hakka Chinese 
were considered uncivilized even by peranakan Chinese that preferred Hokkien immigrants.161
In  regard  to  Chinese  immigration  and  the  sojourning  practice,  it  is  obvious  to  look  at  the 
population growth of the entire Chinese population on Java. Unfortunately this poses a problem as 
complete censuses only were conducted in 20th century when the endeavour became possible to 
accomplish from an administrative point of view. From the early 19 th century only estimates on 
159  Koloniaal Verslag 1866-1872 
160 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3042, Blussé, 'Wills', p.320-321
161 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043, fol.3, NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1850-1900, 2.10.02, no.5037, 
Lohanda, Kapitan Cina, p.102-103
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population  totals  exist.  Earlier  records  of  the  province  of  Batavia  were  even  called  “more  an 
indication then factual information” by the officials reporting. Notwithstanding these analyses the 
vlaues provide us with a rough picture of population development on Java. What became clear is 
that most men with Chinese roots lived in Batavia or other cities. Even Batavia alone accounts for  
one thirds of the total Chinese population on Java in the late 1820's.162
In 1833 the governor-general of the Netherlands Indies estimates that there live about 100.000 
Chinese on the islands of Java and Madura.  He remarked that others had even lower estimates 
ranging around 85.000 souls. Nevertheless this amount seems like an underestimate based more on 
values  derived  from tax  income  rather  than  field  work.  In  1860  a  figure  of  221.438  Chinese 
inhabiting  the  entire  Netherlands  Indies  is  given.  The  territory  in  question  by  then  had  been 
enlarged with parts of Sumatra, Bali and Borneo, and a clear comparison thus cannot be given. By 
1880, ten years after the abandonment on the cultivation system, a figure of 343.793 Chinese is 
given  which  would  account  to  a  2,2%  annual  growth  rate.  However  in  the  same  period  the 
indigenous population outgrew the Chinese minority by far. As a percentage of the total population 
the Chinese actually declined in share; losing 0,1% per decade.  Nonetheless,  immigration from 
China appears to be high, especially when considering the share of the immigrants that were just 
temporary residing on Java or elsewhere on the islands of the Netherlands Indies and left after their  
contracts were fulfilled.163
5. Conclusion
When  returning  to  the  hypothesis:  Chinese  junk  traders  could  commercially  survive  after 
increased European competition during the mid 19th century by switching to passenger trade as a 
source of income, a mixed picture appears. Especially when examining the connection between 
Batavia  and  China,  as  a  wide  variety  of  factors  affected  this  link.  Many  macro  economic 
developments had profound influence on this overseas trade connection, yet some rather specific 
conditions for the Batavian case pertained.
The two dominant developments in the hypothesis, the decline of the Chinese junk trade and the 
subsequent increase in Chinese emigration, were in fact not as closely knitted together as I initially 
suspected.  There  indeed  was  an  overlap  noticeable  between  the  time  frames  of  the  two 
developments, but the decline of the junk trade had set in years before any major emigration took 
place from China. Domestic economic growth in Qing China that did not keep up with population 
162 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043, fol.19-20
163 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043, fol.6, NL-HaNA, Koloniën suppl., 2.10.03, no.24, fol.569, 
Koloniale Studiën, Jrg.20 no.5-6, (Weltevreden, 1936), p.35
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growth, combined with widespread piracy in the South China Sea, were the largest contributors to 
the decline of junk trade.
Chinese junk merchants had several options to escape the waning traditional trade. For instance 
the rise of a much enlarged northern coastal trading zone in which government transports played a 
key role. In the latter part of the 19th century this zone expanded when private trading with Japan 
and  Korea  became  possible  and  Shanghai  became  a  central  pivot.  The  southern  trading  zone 
remained functioning but specialized in bulk goods, of which rice was the primary commodity. This 
shift  was,  besides  piracy,  partly caused by the advancing merchant  fleets  of  European powers. 
Migrants  leaving  China  were  still  too  small  in  number  to  make  their  transport  an  full-time 
occupation. Familial chain migration still remained the norm.
The trade with the Nanyang became trade within the Nanyang as Chinese merchants settled in 
Southeast  Asia.  Initially  to  accommodate  the  growing  rice  trade.  Yet  these  entrepreneurs  also 
provided the cargo capabilities for intra regional trade in Southeast Asia, thus lowering commercial 
opportunities in the region even more for Chinese merchants operating from the southern shores of 
China.  The  British  port  of  Singapore  and  its  free  trade  policy  became  an  attractive  centre  of 
operation and soon developed into the  central market of the region.
The widespread destruction and death the simultaneous Taiping and Nien revolts brought upon 
China at first did not cause massive emigration. However, after the revolts were quelled by Qing 
forces, the economic devastation and slow recovery caused an increasing number of Chinese to 
migrate  elsewhere.  Southeast  Asia  was  the  largest  foreign  destination  for  these  migrants.  To 
facilitate the increasing stream of passengers existing trade connections were utilized, which let to a 
dominant position of Singapore in Southeast Asian in passenger transport as well.
As  passenger  transport  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  trade,  a  mixture  between  western  and 
Chinese  organisations  developed  the  business  in  the  treaty  ports.  The  Chinese  element  is 
noteworthy as  it  remained  dominant  in  Southeast  Asia.  Organisations  at  both  departure  and  a 
destination ports were mainly Chinese run, only rarely as subsidiary of a western company. Most of 
the time only the actual transport over sea was a potential niche where western merchant companies 
could cut in. A development caused by language and trust issues migrants had with westerners but 
also the often necessary credit for the journey seems to have been easier obtained through Chinese 
networks. The enterprises that employed the indentured labourers could very well be in western 
hands though. 
Batavia,  the seat  of colonial  government  of the Netherlands Indies,  remained a  remote port 
detached  from  the  rising  activity  on  these  major  trade  and  passenger  lines.  It  was  not  fully 
integrated in the regional economy because of the implementation of the cultivation system. Besides 
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limiting international trade to Batavia the majority of the produced resources in the Netherlands 
Indies were reserved for the Dutch export market in Europe. As trade in finished products was still a 
undeveloped exchange in the region, the position of Batavia was of minor importance.
The hard division between the external and internal trade arena is essential  in analysing the 
position of the connection between Batavia and China. The domestic market of the Netherlands 
Indies was reserved primarily for its residents. Most of the marine trade in archipelago was in the 
hands of merchants of either Arab or Chinese decent that had settled in the Netherlands Indies. 
International trade was severely limited by the customs measures serving the smooth operation of 
the cultivation system. By the grace of the close vicinity of the entrepôt Singapore,  the Dutch 
colony rarely had problems in supplying her internal market with the necessary goods.
The trade connection from Batavia to the Chinese coast increasingly became in the hands of 
western trading companies. Furthermore had the linkage not the same importance as it used to have, 
the priorities of the colonial government lay with production of export crops under the cultivation 
system. As both trade and colonial interest were feeble, a different reason must have existed for the 
Chinese traders to take the journey to Batavia. Especially after the rice exports from Java faltered 
the  trade  connection  on  its  own  was  barely  lucrative  any  more  for  Chinese  merchants.  An 
explanation for its survival must be sought in the existence of the large Chinese community living 
on Java. 
The tight immigration measures the Dutch took in the Netherlands Indies seems to put an even 
larger strain on the connection to China. Representatives of the local peranakan Chinese repeatedly 
requested  relieving  the  immigration  limitations  or  made  pleas  for  lifting  immigration  bans.  A 
correlation between incoming and outgoing junks and tighter immigration laws or even bans, could 
even be noticed by contemporaries. Remarkable to notice here is the choice of Chinese migrants for 
a direct journey to Batavia, instead of travelling through Singapore as was usual. That migrants with 
pre-existing relations to the Netherlands Indies went straight to Batavia while indentured labourers 
without previous connections in the Nanyang, went through Singapore indicate two things. One; 
some sort of class difference existed between these migrants and two; a difference between these 
particular migrant routes was apparent for the Chinese passengers on departure.
The  transport  of  passengers  made  the  journey  to  Batavia  for  the  Chinese  junk  merchant 
commercially less risky. A profit margin would be assured as the costs of transport of passengers 
mostly were guaranteed by groups instead of individuals, lowering the risk on defaults. Passengers 
furthermore were a stable variable in the profit  margin, while product prices fluctuated and the 
possibility to  switch  to  other  products  was severely limited on the  Netherlands Indies'  market. 
Finally  the  supplementary  income  gave  a  further  incentive  to  Chinese  junk  captains  to  carry 
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passengers.
For this research it is unfortunate that both the cultivation system as the immigration measures 
were  relaxed  at  approximately  the  same  time.  It  cloaks  the  precise  relation  between  Chinese 
migration  and  Chinese  trade  in  case  of  the  city  of  Batavia.  A correlation  between  trade  and 
migration definitely appears to have existed. Yet if Chinese migration fuelled trade or Chinese trade 
fuelled migration is hard to say. For both perspectives valid arguments can be given. In the case of  
the Netherlands Indies it  appears that during the restrictive cultivation system migration helped 
support Chinese trade, while after abandonment of the system trade actually fuelled migration.
The starting hypothesis therefore proved to be false in its inclination. On an macro economic 
level the decline in trade already had set in before European merchant power in the region became 
paramount. Secondly there existed a multitude of alternative ventures for Chinese junk traders to 
choose  from  besides  migrant  transport.  The  Batavian  case  furthermore  cannot  be  called 
representative  for  the  region  because  of  her  distinctive  conditions  in  the  economic  and  public 
domain. Yet even in this case a definite correlation appears to exist between Chinese migration and 
Chinese trade. The transport of passengers made poor performing trade lines such as those between 
Batavia  and southern China,  still  lucrative  for  Chinese junk traders.  To which  extent  a  similar 
relation existed elsewhere in Southeast Asia requires further research. 
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Appendix
Figure 4: The years 1825-1827, 1831-1832 include Siamese vessels, 1838 value unknown.164 
Figure 5: The years 1825-1827, 1830-1832 include Siamese vessels, 1838 value unknown .165
164  NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3194, NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3204, Verslag 
van den Handel 1825-1837, 1839-1852, Koloniaal Verslag 1847/1848-1875
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Figure 6: Values of 1838 and 1853 are unknown.166
Figure 7: Values of 1838 and 1853 are unknown.167
166 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3194, NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3204, Verslag 
van den Handel 1825-1837, 1839-1852, Koloniaal Verslag 1847/1848-1875
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Figure 8: The blue line designates incoming ships and orange line outgoing ships.168
Figure 9: The blue line designates incoming cargo and orange line outgoing cargo.169
168  NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3194, NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3204, Verslag 
van den Handel 1825-1837, 1839-1852, Koloniaal Verslag 1847/1848-1875
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